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I. Introduction

To say that pharmaceuticals enjoy near-total products
liability immunity may invite an eyebrow or two to rise. The
industry does not think of itself as immune from anything, and
alarms about what products liability does to it have filled news
reports for decades. 1 One important American newspaper
regularly runs editorials about liability devastating the sector. 2
Almost every major manufacturer has shelled out millions in
Department of Justice settlements—some have paid more—for
misconduct related to the marketing of a prescription drug. 3 Add
scandals, 4 bad press, 5 alarm about the death of innovation, 6 and
1. See Han W. Choi & Jae Hong Lee, Pharmaceutical Product Liability, in
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 688, 688 (Lionel D.
Edwards et al. eds., 2011) (observing that “[p]roducts liability actions against
pharmaceutical companies are among the most widely publicized classes of suits
in the United States and Europe”).
2. See Fighting a Tort Plague, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2019, at A16
(discussing an improper drug warning label case pending before the Supreme
Court); More Lawsuits = Higher Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2018, at A18
(expressing the view that more prescription drug litigation raises the cost of
prescription drugs).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Duff Wilson, Glaxo to Pay $750 Million for
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throw in a multibillion-dollar opioid crisis whose consequences in
the law have commenced to round out a picture of the
prescription drug industry in today’s United States. 7 Prescription
drugs are indeed deemed unacceptably bad in numerous venues,
including popular discourse 8 and the boardrooms where decisions
Sale of Bad Products, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010), https://perma.cc/6HFS-RKFH
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (reporting on drug giant GlaxoSmithKline’s operation
of a plant in Puerto Rico that produced contaminated antidepressants, diabetes
medications, and acid reflux drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. See, e.g., John LaMattina, Pharma’s Reputation Continues to
Suffer—What Can Be Done to Fix It?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2013, 8:27 AM),
https://perma.cc/X4PY-YLB8 (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (attributing a lack of
transparency in corporate activities and prioritizing profits over fair pricing
practices to the pharmaceutical industry’s poor reputation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, How Stale Is Innovation in Drug Discovery?
Think:
5-Year-Old
Yogurt,
FORTUNE
(Mar.
6,
2018),
https://perma.cc/Y9A6-NDDN (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (pointing out that on
average, thirty large and small biotech companies got just eleven percent of
their 2017 revenue from drugs developed within the past five years) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing
investors’ frustrations with limited innovation in the development of new
antibiotics).
7. This crisis has not yet manifested much accountability for the sector.
See BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: AN EMPIRE OF DECEIT AND THE ORIGIN OF
AMERICA’S OPIOID EPIDEMIC 155–72 (2d ed. 2018) (corroborating this
proposition); see also Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’
Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2305 (2017)
(observing that “opioid litigation has yet to financially dent the
$13-billion-a-year opioid industry” and that opioid litigation “victories have all
taken the form of settlements”). See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Current
State of Opioid Litigation, 70 S.C. L. REV. 565 (2019) (provisioning a thorough
and recent review of case law grouped under “opioid litigation” that omits
personal injury actions altogether, confining itself to actions initiated by
governments); Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False
Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153 (1997) (concluding that units of
government are safer than human plaintiffs from attacks on their prudence and
entitlements to collect money); Jef Feeley, Drugmakers Balk at Funding Opioid
Epidemic Fix; Counting on Court Wins, INS. J. (May 4, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4AUP-YJST (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (explaining that “[d]rug
companies are in no rush to finance a solution to the opioid epidemic,”
preferring “to take their chances in court rather than pay billions of dollars to
settle lawsuits blaming them for addictions”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
8. See Alison Kodjak, Poll: Americans Support Government Action to Curb
Prescription Drug Prices, NPR (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/K6EN-8SC8 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2019) (discussing a nonpartisan poll which concluded that “a
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to withdraw or pay up for injurious products get made. 9
Affronting genteel museums in New York and London so much
that they turn down cash money is hard for a rich donor to do,
but the opioid-profiteering Sackler family pulled off this dubious
achievement in 2019 when the stench of its notorious prescription
drug, OxyContin, grew too severe to overlook. 10 Law-based
adversities that the drug sector continues to experience include
product recalls, 11 criminal and civil penalties for violating the
False Claims Act, 12 and governmental refusals to approve new
majority [of Americans] welcome government action to help cut the cost of
medications” because they think prescription drug prices are too high) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Angelica LaVito, Johnson & Johnson Faces a Crucial Hearing
Monday over Thousands of Talc Baby Powder Lawsuits, CNBC (July 22, 2019,
10:52 AM), https://perma.cc/N858-CGJZ (last updated July 22, 2019, 2:23 PM)
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (noting that it was Johnson & Johnson’s decision to
fight charges against it in court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
10. See Elizabeth A. Harris, The Met Will Turn Down Sackler Money amid
Fury over the Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/8FJPHZZ7 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (reporting that the Metropolitan Museum of
Art in New York City was going to “stop accepting gifts from members of the
Sackler family linked to the maker of OxyContin” and that the Tate Modern in
London and the Solomon R. Guggenheim in New York City had taken similar
steps to distance themselves from the family) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Alex Marshall, Museums Cut Ties with the Sacklers as
Outrage over Opioid Crisis Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/NYA8-Q79M (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (reporting that
Britain’s National Portrait Gallery decided to cancel a planned $1.3 million
donation from longtime Sackler benefactors) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Soo Youn, NYU Langone No Longer Accepting Donations from
the Sacklers, the Family that Owns Oxycontin Maker Purdue Pharma,
ABCNEWS (June 12, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://perma.cc/QT76-CW3Z (last visited
Oct. 12, 2019) (“NYU Langone Health now says it is no longer taking money
from the [Sackler] family—and it says it is ‘evaluating’ whether its Sackler
Institute of Graduate Biomedical Sciences will hold on to its name.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan, Blood Pressure Medicine is Recalled, N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/C54Y-EE7G (last visited Oct. 18, 2019)
(announcing the recall of a prescription blood pressure medicine by the Food and
Drug Administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018). See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Insys, the
Opioid Drug Maker, to Pay $225 Million to Settle Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5G6-ZURV (last visited Oct. 18, 2019)
(covering opioids manufacturer Insys Therapeutics’ $225 million settlement for
a False Claims Act violation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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drug applications and marketing strategies. 13 The locus of this
liability
in
Article,
however,
is
liability—products
particular—where a court concludes that a manufactured object
is defective or could be called defective by a factfinder following a
trial. Drug manufacturers enjoy near-immunity from this
consequence. This simple fact on the products liability ground
continues to escape notice.
In clarifying an ill-understood state of the law, this Article
holds back on overt condemnation of what it observes. Skepticism
about the fit between products liability and prescription drugs
certainly could be defended. Judges and juries competent enough
to assess a more mundane product—a Coke bottle 14 or a power
tool marketed to home hobbyists, 15 for example—might be
unsuited to the task of determining defectiveness of a
prescription drug. Instead of lamenting the absence of products
liability redress for injured drug consumers, this Article pursues
transparency about what it reports.
Transparent legal immunity for product-caused harm has
elsewhere been attained. For example, Congress has chosen to
block tort redress for persons injured by gun shootings and for
municipalities that spend money on gun emergency services. 16
Closer to our subject, Congress enacted an alternative
13. See, e.g., Adam Feuerstein, Sarepta Stumbles on FDA Rejection of a
New Drug to Treat Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, STAT NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/P63P-MFCJ (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (detailing the FDA’s
rejection of a market application for a second drug that aimed to treat children
with a rare muscle-wasting disease) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
14. See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)
(involving a products liability claim against a bottling manufacturer for an
exploding bottle of Coke).
15.
See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal.
1963) (en banc) (involving a defective power tool that could be used as a saw,
drill, or wood lathe).
16. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03
(2018)
[A] purpos[e] of this chapter [is] as follows: to prohibit causes of
action against manufacturers, distributors, and importers of firearms
or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm
solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products
or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as
designed and intended.

8

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020)

compensation scheme for harms linked to vaccines. 17 Agree or
disagree with legislative decisions to insulate guns and vaccines
from products liability, one can look up the particulars of these
shelters. They state what they forbid and permit. Activists who
succeeded in getting these exceptions enacted know what they
achieved; opponents who wish to undo or modify these reforms
understand what they have to change; injured persons can try to
work around their barrier to redress. 18
The prescription-drug version of immunity is different.
Foremost, it is not absolute. All doctrinal tickets to court
available for injuries by other products exist in principle for this
one, and American courts are ostensibly willing to hear
complaints that use any doctrine available elsewhere in products
liability. 19
Modern products liability identifies three categories of
product defect; 20 courts insulate drug manufacturers from
responsibility for all three. 21 The simplest type of defect is the
manufacturing kind, where the product as made and sold did not
conform to what its maker intended. Lapses of this kind are
rare. 22 When a lapse occurs, it is trivial—cheap to defend, I
17. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et seq.
(2018)
(establishing
“the
National
Vaccine
Injury
Compensation
Program . . . under which compensation may be paid for a vaccine-related injury
or death”).
18. See, e.g., Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, No.
FBTCV156048103S, 2016 WL 8115354, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019), and cert. denied,
Remington Arms Co. v. Soto, No. 19-168, 2019 WL 5875142, at *1 (U.S. 2019)
(offering a novel application of negligent entrustment).
19. See generally Freeman v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827
(Neb. 2000) (engaging with seven distinct liability doctrines).
20. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 534–52 (2d ed. 2005)
(summarizing the three types of product defects—manufacturing flaws, design
flaws, and insufficient warnings of danger and instructions on safe use).
21. Id. at 549; see also Aaron D. Twerski, The Demise of Drug Design
Litigation: Death by Federal Preemption, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 281 (2018)
(explaining that manufacturers of generic drugs are insulated from failure to
warn and design defect claims).
22. Manufacturing defects are rare in part because drug-sector regulators
impose quality standards that demand care in manufacture. See STEVEN
GARBER, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION 18
(2013) (noting that although manufacturing defect claims are uncommon,
several were brought against drug manufacturers in the late 2000s). Every now
and then a manufacturing plant runs into trouble with the FDA over quality
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mean—because it injures only one unfortunate victim at a time.
Plaintiffs impugn a deviation, not an entire line.
Because the next two types of defect are found in every unit
that rolls into commerce, judicial willingness to accept either of
them matters to manufacturers. Fortunately for them, courts are
hostile to both defective design and defective warning claims. The
former hostility is better known than the latter: scholars steadily
report that design defect is almost unavailable to drug
plaintiffs. 23 As Part II will soon document: yes indeed. The
doomed nature of warning claims in drug products liability
litigation is a subtler condition, but here too plaintiffs seldom
succeed.
By any quantitative measure, plaintiff victories in drug
litigation add up to insignificance. Manufacturing defects rarely
happen and when they occur they have no impact on defendants’
bottom line. Design defects almost never exist, as far as courts
are concerned, and warning defects only slightly less infrequently
exist. The next Parts build an explanation for this near-total
immunity in two stages.
Manufacturer-friendly doctrine reviewed in Part III offers a
necessary start, but it is only the first pass. “Because two
Restatements favor manufacturers,” “because preemption does
the same,” and “because causation is a high hurdle for plaintiffs”
are not enough to explain near-total immunity. 24 They are true
statements, but where did these stances come from? All have
been resisted in litigation, scholarship, and Restatement fights
inside the American Law Institute. 25 These struggles all could
control. See R.D. McDowall, Quality Assurance Implications for Computerized
Systems Following the Able Laboratories Inspection, 10 QUALITY ASSURANCE J.
15 (2006) (reporting that Able Labs ceased manufacturing operations, recalled
its entire product line, and withdrew seven abbreviated new drug applications
for failing to comply with regulations following an FDA inspection).
23. See OWEN, supra note 20, at 549 (suggesting that for purposes of
products liability, drug design defects “simply [don’t] matter”); see also Twerski,
supra note 21, at 304 (writing that “drug design . . . has played only a minor role
in drug litigation”).
24. See infra Part III (discussing insulations from liability for drug
manufacturers and barriers to redress for plaintiffs).
25. See infra Part III.A (discussing Restatement disagreements within the
American Law Institute; infra Part III.B (exploring the role of federal
preemption in prescription drug products liability cases); infra Part III.C
(examining the role of causation as an element in a prescription drug products
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have come out more favorably to consumers and plaintiffs. The
drug sector scores low on popularity, 26 and numerous individuals
get hurt by what it so profitably sells, the (relatively) rich and
powerful pill-swallowing American senior citizenry prominent
among them. 27 Why do judges, legislators, and attentive members
of the public consistently let it win in court?
The current state of the law, I will argue, appears healthier
than it really is because unexamined premises about the
no-liability status quo sound plausible and soothing. Figurative
pillars expounded on in Part IV hold up a barely-seen exception
to accountability under the law. Prescription drugs look worthier
of indulgence than other products, I contend, because they
purport to increase welfare beyond the satisfaction of individual
preferences.
Non-drug products warrant very little approval beyond the
pleasure they give their users. If you like your ladder, shampoo
brand, video game, power tool, automobile and so on, that’s nice,
but the rest of us have scant reason to care about the possibility
that this object of your affection will leave the market for any
reason, including too much liability. What you want to remain
available for your purchase until you move on to something else
holds value for you, but not necessarily for others.
Drugs are different. 28 In contrast to other products that
purport only to give buyers what they want, this genre purports
to give every one of us what we need. Judgments that transfer
money to individuals at the expense of a savior-sector seem
perverse. From there, a deferential-to-manufacturers consensus
liability cases).
26. See Robert Cyran, Big Pharma on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2017), https://perma.cc/NLA6-MUEX (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (explaining that
high prescription drug prices have made the pharmaceutical industry unpopular
with the vast majority of Americans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
27. On wealth held by the age cohort likely to take prescription drugs, see
The Rising Age Gap in Economic Well-being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://perma.cc/2SNE-27YB (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (observing that over the
last quarter-century, “[t]he [o]ld [h]ave [p]rosper[ed] [r]elative to the [y]oung”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 168 (2001) (advocating an approach that takes the
consumer interests of all potential patients into account, not just the welfare of
those helped by a particular drug’s proper prescription and consumption).
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has emerged and holds steady. Part IV of this Article, which like
the preceding Part includes the word “questionable” in its
heading,
explores
four
beliefs
about
supposed
pharma-benevolence that appear shared by more than the
industry, reaching the level almost of conventional wisdom. The
figurative pillars help support one-sided results in court. As this
Part elaborates, all four need attention. Every one of the pillars
on examination turns out at least a bit shaky. Putting them
forward for review starts a necessary discussion.
II. Case Law Reports Almost No Wins for Plaintiffs
Phrases like “almost no wins” and “near-total immunity” call
for attention to a numerator and denominator. 29 For this purpose,
the numerator is the number of wins in decisional law for
plaintiffs—a win defined tolerantly as any judicial decision in
which a court in the United States allowed an allegation of any
kind of defect that would cover all manufactured units of a
prescription drug (that is to say, design defect or warning defect)
to reach a jury. The denominator is the total number of
prescription drugs on the American market within reach of
products liability. For different reasons, both numbers elude
precise count. Enough information exists, however, to support a
bottom-line conclusion: The ratio between the numerator and
denominator is tiny—not zero wins for plaintiffs, but almost
none. 30
29. See generally Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical
Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436 (2010)
(using this approach to study how often the international crime of piracy is
prosecuted).
30. Several readers of this Article have commented that good results for
plaintiffs extend beyond the “wins” or “numerator” that I have gathered. In an
era of the so-called vanishing trial, almost all the action in litigation certainly
occurs in settlements rather than outcomes that judges publish. See generally
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004)
(discussing the decline in the number of cases resolved by a jury trial in the
United States). Moreover, as Neil Cohen has reasonably queried, what if the
quality of prescription drugs is good? Even a tiny numerator could be too large
in relation to the merits of contentions about defect. I agree. Yet even in a
settlement perspective, it still bears notice that drug plaintiffs very seldom
prevail in actions an outsider like me can know about—if only because limited
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A. Cases That Could Qualify as Plaintiff Wins

No tallies undertake to count drug products liability actions
decided in American courts. Aided by research assistants, I
combed two broad sources of data: First, judicial decisions as
gathered in Westlaw (including those classified as both published
and unpublished), and second, the copyrighted text Drugs in
Litigation, a compendium first published in 1976 and regularly
updated on Lexis. 31 The first search worked with variations on
familiar search terms—drug, prescription, product, design,
warning, defect, pharmaceutical, liability—that we repeated until
this jargon ceased to yield new hits. Drugs in Litigation lists
names of pharmaceutical products in alphabetical order. Each of
the two sources yielded cases not found in the other.
Neither Drugs in Litigation nor the Westlaw searches done
for this Article put an age limit on materials eligible for inclusion,
but the oldest cases present in both sources were decided in the
1970s. This result is consistent with the emergence of robust
modern products liability during that decade, 32 and the scarcity
until then of judicial decisions featuring drug-manufacturer
defendants in particular. Courts did not instantly follow bold
midcentury innovation from California and the American Law
Institute on products liability, 33 and they added another level of
delay before putting prescription drugs in the category. 34
success in court drives down the value of claims that negotiation resolves. See
Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 149,
150–51 (2019) (discussing possible systematic biases).
31. See RICHARD PATTERSON, DRUGS IN LITIGATION: DAMAGE AWARDS
INVOLVING PRESCRIPTION AND NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Matthew Bender ed.,
2018) (providing a “compilation of personal injury cases involving adverse
reactions of prescription and nonprescription drugs” for legal and medical
professionals).
32. See OWEN, supra note 20 at 23 (remarking that 1965 was “the birth of
modern products liability law in America”).
33. Most states did not adopt strict products liability as first recognized in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), until several
years after the Restatement (Second) of Torts formally set forth the doctrine in
1965. See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw.
1970) (“Although this court has never had the occasion to rule on this matter, it
is the modern tread and the better reasoned view that strict liability in tort is a
sound legal basis for recovery in products liability cases.”); Johnson v. Am.
Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974) (“The status of the law . . . may be
best clarified by the express adoption of the rule of strict liability in tort, as set
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Some of the cases that turned up in the first haul ended up
deleted. I removed vaccine cases from the tally because Congress
went on to take this product out of the reach of products
liability. 35 Also on the cutting-room floor landed cases from Drugs
in Litigation where the drug in litigation was non-prescription;
pro-plaintiff decisions that went on to be reversed; and decisions
where courts focused on the culpability of individuals to the
exclusion of attention to the drug. The much-cited Lance v.
Wyeth, 36 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made a rare
choice to let a design defect claim survive, left the roster because
the FDA had hustled the defective drug (a constituent of the
notorious fen-phen) from the market nine years before the
plaintiff filed her action: 37 Lance fell under the label of moot.
This preamble in place, approximately thirty brand names of
drugs can stand for plaintiff wins in the sense that at least one
injured person convinced a court to permit a claim of design
defect or warning defect to survive summary judgment, and that
decision in the plaintiff’s favor was not overruled: Accutane, 38
Androgel, 39 Bendectin, 40 Chymopapain, 41 Clomid, 42 Delalutin, 43
forth in § 402A [of the Restatement of Torts] . . . .”); West v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976) (“We adopt the doctrine of strict liability as
stated by the . . . Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.”).
34. Cf. Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier:
A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 533 n.34 (1974) (arguing that the plaintiffs’
bar got lucky in the 1960s when one defendant, Sterling Drug, persisted in
appealing “a rather losing set of facts” in multiple courts, generating decisions
that nurtured the fledgling doctrine of failure to warn).
35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
36. 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014).
37. See id. at 437 (confirming that in September 1997, the FDA had
announced that the drug at issue “would no longer be made available in the
United States” and characterizing the personal injury and wrongful death
lawsuits that followed as “a tidal wave of litigation”).
38. Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 846 (Neb. 2000).
39. In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14 C
1748MDL No. 2545, 2017 WL 2313201, at *7–11, (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2017).
40. Bendectin is a doubtful win. The plaintiff did prevail in Mekdeci v.
Merrell National Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983) but subsequent
decisional law, especially Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, (9th Cir. 1995), dealt a death knell to liability going forward.
41. Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
42. Sullivan v. Aventis, Inc., No. 14-cv-2939-NSR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107360, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015).
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Depakote, 44 Depo Medrol, 45 Dilantin, 46 Duphaston, 47 Duragesic, 48
Elidel, 50 Halcion, 51
Isotretinoin, 52
Levaquin, 53
Effient, 49
54
55
56
57
Ortho-Novum,
Panalba,
Parlodel,
Paxil, 58
MER/29,
43. Barson ex. rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah
1984).
44. Barron v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Mo. 2017) (en banc);
see also Smalley v. Lobas, JVR No. 359699, 1998 WL 1060870 (Pa. Oct. 1, 1998).
45. Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
46. PATTERSON, supra note 31, cites Mooney v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 77355-NPZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 12, 1979); Alboher v. Parke-Davis, Inc., No. 80 Civ.
0046 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1983); and Keenan v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 84-1667
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 1990), along with several wins for the manufacturer.
47. Glass v. Philips Roxane, No. C0270-762 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1983).,
in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Dydrogesterone.”
48. Duragesic is a fentanyl patch. See Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F. Supp.
195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing a failure to warn claim). Janssen
Pharmaceutical Products L.P. v. Hodgemire, a decision that focused mainly on
the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert testimony, accepted a design defect claim.
49 So. 3d 767, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). In DiCosolo v. Janssen
Pharmaceuticals., Inc., the plaintiff brought what the court called a “nonspecific
defect” claim and won an $18 million judgment, which was affirmed on appeal.
951 N.E. 2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
49. Estate of DeMoss v. Eli Lilly & Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 873, 879–80 (W.D.
Ky. 2017).
50. Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (E.D. Ky.
2006).
51. Carlin v. Upjohn Co., 920 P.2d 1347, 1355 (Cal. 1996).
52. McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La-Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 225 (N.J. 2017);
Mason v. Hoffman-LaRoche, No. 01-2416-CA (Fla. Escambia County Ct. Oct. 11,
2007), in PATTERSON, supra note 31 at “Isotretinoin.”
53. Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 08-5743 (JRT) (D.
Minn. Dec. 7, 2010), in PATTERSON, supra note 31 at “Levofloxacin.”
54. Successful litigation against MER/29 took place long enough ago that
products liability diction had not yet found a home in case law. See Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (affirming
compensatory and punitive damages award without reference to defect). See
generally Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful
Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968) (providing a frontlines
account of MER/29 litigation).
55. Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 544 (Or. 1974); Wooderson v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1065 (Kan. 1984).
56. Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42, 47 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
57. Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Roberts, No. 94-CA-2757-MR (Ky. Ct. App.
Aug. 9, 1996), in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Bromocriptine Mesylate.”
58. Estates of Tobin v. Smithkline Beecham Pharms., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1278, 1287–90 (D. Wyo. 2001).
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Phenergan, 59 Posicor, 60 Prempro, 61 Thyalis, 62 Topamax, 63 Vioxx, 64
Xanax, 65 Xarelto, 66 and Yutopar. 67
Of foremost interest in this list is what is not on it. Opioids,
for starters, are mostly though not entirely absent. 68 An
especially salient omission is the most vilified of prescription
opioids, OxyContin. 69 Its manufacturer, Purdue Pharma, has
beaten numerous plaintiffs in decisional law. 70 Vioxx, the most
infamous brand name present on the roster, 71 generated zero
59. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
60. Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 730 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003).
61. Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83 (D. Conn. 2014);
Rivera-Adams v. Wyeth, No. 03-1713 (JAF), 2010 WL 5072541, at *3 (D.P.R.
Dec. 8, 2010).
62. United States v. Lanpar Co., 293 F. Supp. 147, 154–55 (N.D. Tex.
1968).
63. Gurley v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 113 A.3d 283, 295 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015).
64. Humeston v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-2272-03-MT (N.J. Atlantic
County Ct. Nov. 3, 2005); Garza v. Merck & Co., No. DC-03-841 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Apr. 21, 2006), in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Rofecoxib.”
65. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Alaska 1992).
66. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2592, 2017 WL
1395312, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2017).
67. Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 993 F.2d 528, 545 (6th Cir. 1993).
68. Duragesic falls in the opioid category. See Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F.
Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that Duragesic is a skin patch that
contains the opioid fentanyl).
69. See Sujata S. Jayawant & Rajesh Balkrishnan, The Controversy
Surrounding Oxycontin Abuse: Issues and Solutions, 1 THERAPEUTICS &
CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 77, 78 (2005) (noting that OxyContin has received
substantial attention for its “addiction liability and abuse potential”).
70. See, e.g., Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 236 F. App’x 511, 521 (11th Cir.
2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s failure to warn claim); McCauley v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 465 (W.D. Va. 2004) (ruling against OxyContin
plaintiffs on causation); Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171,
176 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that plaintiffs’ OxyContin injury was not
cognizable).
71. This painkiller generated litigation costly to its manufacturer. See Alex
Berenson, Merck Agrees to Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2007), https://perma.cc/U8Z2-TP5U (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting Merck
agreed to pay $4.85 billion to settle 27,000 lawsuits by individuals who were
harmed by Vioxx) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Deciding
to withdraw this drug wiped out $26.8 billion from Merck’s market
capitalization. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., A Tale of Two Cities: A
Commentary on the Media’s Response to Personal Injury “Feeding Frenzies” as a
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published judicial conclusions on what about it could be deemed
defective; the citations above are to two unpublished decisions.
No thalidomide on the list either. Diethystylbestrol (DES), a
never-patented hormone, was costly to its sellers in the 1980s, 72
but to this day lacks any judicial analysis of its defectiveness or
manufacturer negligence because courts that ruled for DES
plaintiffs seemed to presume product defect or breach of duty
without discussing the issue. 73
Several names that fill the list of plaintiff wins would be
equally at home in the list of plaintiff losses. Patients who took
some of these drugs, including but not limited to Bendectin,
Dilantin, Duragesic, Ortho-Novum, and Paxil, brought
personal-injury actions in court that failed. 74 Delalutin later went
on to be exonerated by later studies and thus was not defective,
said a New Jersey court after the Barson win for plaintiffs in
Utah. 75
The numerator is misleadingly large in other respects. The
majority of the wins alleged warning defect, a cause of action
increasingly vulnerable to preemption. 76 Design defect wins are
extra tiny in number. The significant and enduring design defect
win for plaintiffs—a case to take seriously not only when it was
Result of the Vioxx and Silicosis Litigation, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 47, 53 (2009)
(“As a result of Merck’s withdrawal of Vioxx, the company was forced to forgo
any future profits from a recorded $2.5 billion in sales in 2003, and erasing
$26.8 billion from its market capitalization.”).
72. Anita Bernstein, Markets of Mothers, in TORTS STORIES 151, 165 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
73. See id. at 157 (noting that judges typically began by presuming that
DES manufacturers could be found liable if the identification problem were
resolved); see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Mich. 1984)
(accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as sufficient without discussing breach).
74. See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Bendectin loss); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1024 (10th
Cir. 2001) (Dilantin loss); Miller v. ALZA Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 945 (S.D.
Ohio 2010) (Duragesic loss); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 95 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Ortho-Novum loss). Dolan v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 901 F.3d 803,
816 (7th Cir. 2018) (Paxil loss).
75. Zweig v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 536 A.2d 1280, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988).
76. See infra Part III.B (discussing preemption as an insulation to
liability). Design defect claims are also vulnerable. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v.
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 493 (2013) (concluding that design defect claims are
preempted when the drug is generic).
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decided but going forward—is Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 77 in which a
Connecticut federal court wrote a published decision accepting a
design defect claim for Prempro, a synthetic hormone still
marketed as a menopause treatment. 78 Prempro actions came
together in a robust multidistrict litigation in Arkansas; 79 the
successor of Wyeth announced in 2012 that it expected to pay out
more than $1.2 billion for the harms of this product. 80 But even
this triumph for plaintiffs has a counter-record. Ample decisional
law disagrees with Fraser and sides with the manufacturer. 81 The
billion-plus settlement expense was announced two years before a
court approved a design-defect claim, 82 suggesting that products
liability was relatively insignificant even in drug design-defect
liability’s greatest hit.
Did my searches find every drug win that plaintiffs achieved
in court? No: they are a first round of counting. That said, two
concluding remarks about the numerator.
First, other searches could well cause the total to drop rather
than rise, because a drug that suffers under decisional law can
turn its fortunes around. The manufacturer of Bendectin—a
marginal example of a drug deemed bad, but one I decided to
leave in—took this morning-sickness pill off the U.S. market in
77. 992 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D. Conn. 2014).
78. See id. at 84 (declining to grant defendant-manufacturer’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiffs’ design defect claim).
79. See generally In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1398
(J.P.M.L. 2008).
80. Jef Feeley, Pfizer Paid $896 Million in Prempro Settlements,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/2JBT-AJ39 (last visited Oct.
23, 2019) (noting that the settlement resolved only about sixty percent of the
lawsuits filed against Prempro) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The multidistrict litigation wrapped up in 2016. See Order, In re
Prempro Prods., No. 03-CV-1507 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 9, 2016), ECF No. 3315
(closing the action “since all substantive issues have been resolved”).
81. See, e.g., Torkie-Tork v. Wyeth, 757 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (E.D. Va.
2010) (finding for defendant-manufacturer); Tsavaris v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
15-cv-21826, 2016 WL 375008, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2016) (granting
defendant-manufacturer’s motion to dismiss); Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549,
585 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008) (granting defendant-manufacturer’s motion
for summary judgment).
82. Compare Feeley, supra note 80 (announcing the settlement amount in
2012), with Fraser, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (approving a design defect claim in a
decision published in 2014).
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1983 when claims grew profuse, 83 but Bendectin regained FDA
approval and is back under another name. 84 Observers have
applied the label of “junk science” to Bendectin plaintiffs’
proffered evidence about defect and causation. 85 Second, because
the list includes decisional law that merely denied summary
disposition rather than entered judgments for plaintiffs, the wins
list includes cases that may well have gone on to defeats.
B. The Enormous Denominator
Difficulties of how and what to count continue in what this
Article calls the denominator—the population of prescription
drugs that could have been accused in court of defectiveness. One
way to think about the denominator is to consider the dollar size
of this market. Estimates vary; all are high. In 2002, the
Congressional Budget Office stated that over the next decade,
Americans over the age of sixty-five would spend $1.8 trillion
on prescription drugs. 86 More recently, a student author observed
that “[c]onsumer spending on pharmaceutical drugs in the United
States is nearly $425 billion per year and is estimated to top $600
billion by 2020.” 87 Another student-authored assessment priced
83. See Dennis Thompson, Doctors Divided over Report That Popular
Morning Sickness Drug Doesn’t Work, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Z6NX-994F (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (reporting that the drug
was voluntarily pulled from the market in the 1980s over concerns that it was
linked with birth defects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. Bendectin now goes by the rather odd name of Diclegis. See Margaret F.
Steele, FDA Allows Return of Drug for Morning Sickness, WEBMD (Apr. 9,
2013), https://perma.cc/3N5Z-YWV4 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (stating that the
revamped drug is “the only medication specifically approved to treat the
stomach upset many women suffer from during pregnancy”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial
Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation
Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 338–39 (1999) (stating that the Bendectin
litigation was a “significant source of controversy” regarding expert opinions
“not well-founded in scientific methodology” and “departures from the
mainstream of scientific opinion”).
86. See Chad D. Silker, America's New War on Drugs: Should the United
States Legalize Prescription Drug Reimportation?, 31 J. LEGIS. 379, 381 (2005)
(estimating that Americans spent $140.6 billion on outpatient prescription
drugs in 2001 alone).
87. Daniel Burke, Note, An Examination of Product Hopping by
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American prescription drug spending at $323 billion in 2016,
“after rebates and discounts.” 88 A third of a trillion in 2017, said a
U.S. government report. 89
A more apples-to-apples approach looks for the number of
drugs in the denominator. The Food and Drug Administration
publishes lists of approved drugs in a reference nicknamed the
Orange Book. 90 This text provides names, dosages, and data to
guide substitution decisions for patients, but no count. 91 I tasked
a research assistant with the laborious work of going through the
Orange Book to estimate its tally, excluding entries that repeated
the name of a drug with a different dosage. While a drug
approved at both, say, ten milligram and fifty milligram doses
could defensibly be counted as two separate products, I counted
each named drug only once. The total of prescription drugs
yielded was just over 15,000.
The real denominator is bigger, and not only because
different numbers of milligrams do bespeak different products. 92
The FDA drops from the Orange Book drugs that lost their
approval because of safety or efficacy concerns. 93 Such drugs were
marketed before they left the compendium. Their number, though
not officially known or counted, is greater than zero. 94

Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem and a Proposed
Solution, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 419 (2018).
88. Cami R. Schiel, Comment, Leveraging Pharma to Lower Premiums:
Medical Loss Ratio Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2018 BYU L.
REV. 205, 208 (2018).
89. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NAT’L HEALTH
EXPENDITURES 2017 HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/VQ7T-TVHD (PDF)
(stating that prescription drug spending increased 0.4 percent to $333.4 billion).
90. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2019) [hereinafter Orange Book]
(identifying drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by
the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
91. Id. at 3-1–3-452.
92. See id. (separating different prescription drugs by milligram base).
93. See id. at iv (“The main criterion for the inclusion of any product is that
the product is the subject of an application with an approval that has not been
withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons.”).
94. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel
Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration Between 2001
and 2010, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N, 1854, 1856 (2017).

20

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020)

Thirty divided by 15,000 equals 0.002. Imprecision in both
numerator and denominator makes me hesitate to say that
roughly 99.8% of prescription drugs are, as far as courts that hear
products liability claims are concerned, good enough: but this
percentage is close to accurate. One-fifth of one percent amounts
to almost no bad drugs and near-total products liability
immunity. I turn now to explaining this result.
III. Questionable Doctrinal Supports for Immunity
Doctrinal supports for drug manufacturers examined in this
section are two Restatements of Torts, preemption of state-law
tort claims against manufacturers, and causation as an element
of a products liability prima facie case. These three sources are
hardly the only advantages for defendants in this battleground,
but they have interesting traits in common. What makes them
questionable is more than just the trenchant and persuasive
criticism they have been receiving for decades, 95 only some of
which I review here. Separately and together, they reinforce the
denial of redress while appearing relatively neutral on the
surface. Three separate headwinds for plaintiffs and tailwinds for
defendants have more force in combination than apart.
A. Restatement Insulations from Liability
American courts have at hand a uniquely American creation
to aid their consideration of claims that litigants bring:
Restatements. 96 Though published by a private nonprofit
organization rather than a legislature or other state actor, 97
Restatements as published by the American Law Institute (ALI)

95. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 864 (1983)
(offering a now 37-year-old critique of comment k to Section 402A of the Second
Restatement).
96. See Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE
L.J. 643, 649–52 (1933) (examining the origin of the Restatements).
97. See id. at 644 (discussing the American Law Institute’s role in drafting
the Restatements).
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strongly influence judge-made law. Through its Restatements,
the ALI has installed “an unofficial form of codification.” 98
Judges who decide drug products liability actions continue to
cite two Restatements of Torts. 99 The ALI published the original
Restatement (here the “Second”) in 1965 after committing to it in
1964. 100 The new one (the “Third” or the “Products Liability
Restatement”) came out in 1998 following ALI approval in
1997. 101
Section 402A of the Second Restatement, the provision on
products liability prepared by William Prosser, is the ALI’s
greatest hit; no other Restatement rule on any subject has been
cited as much. 102 Decades after the arrival of a newer
Restatement, courts continue to cite this creation. Section 402A
does not say much about prescription drugs but what it does
contain—a disquisition by Prosser labeled comment k—has also
won considerable approval in the form of ample and ongoing
citation. 103 This section has even entered statutory law. 104
98. See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case
Law in the Twenty-first Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 669 (1998) (noting
that although the Restatements are only persuasive authority, they significantly
influence the administration of justice).
99. See, e.g., Burnham v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 109, 112 (D.
Mass. 2018) (relying on the Second Restatement of Torts in discussion of a
design defect claim for a drug product); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618
N.W.2d 827, 837–38 (Neb. 2000) (engaging with the Third Restatement in a
consideration of drug product liability).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (stating
that this text was approved for publication in 1963, except for an amendment of
section 402A authorized in 1964).
101. See Robert D. Klein, A Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability and the Maryland Law of Products Liability, 30 U. BALT. L.
REV. 273, 276 (2001) (recounting that in May 1997, the membership of the
American Law Institute approved publication of the Third Restatement).
102. FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 49 (2011); see also Andrew F. Popper, Restatement
Third Goes to Court, 35 TRIAL 54, 56 n.13 (1999) (stating that according to
records maintained by the ALI, § 402A has been cited more times than any
other Restatement section).
103. See, e.g., In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod.
Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 772 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Texas Supreme Court has
incorporated § 402A into its common law . . . and has considered comment k in
the prescription-drug context.” (internal citation omitted)); Smith v. Howmedica
Osteonics Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3d 844, 848 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (discussing at length
the applicability of comment k to the facts of the case); In re Testosterone
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The other Restatement has different and complementary
virtues. Prosser wrote Section 402A almost on a blank slate:
“virtually no case authority and relatively little scholarship”
underlaid his announcement of strict liability for this category of
injury. 105 When the Third Restatement came out, products
liability was a well-established subfield of torts. 106 From the
start, the Products Liability Restatement could include extensive
case citations in its Reporter’s Notes. Although James Henderson
and Aaron Twerski drafted some of their Restatement to codify
the doctrinal outcomes they favored rather than those that courts
had manifested in decisional law, 107 their blackletter rests much
more on precedent than did its predecessor. It is also much fuller.
Prescription drugs fall into the margin of Section 402A—just one
comment among many—but occupy all of Section 6 in the Third
Restatement. 108
Judges and lawyers working in prescription drug liability
appear well provisioned on the Restatement front, in short.
Section 402A gives them famous, influential, and extraordinarily
durable blackletter with a discussion of prescription drugs
appended. Section 6 of the Third Restatement gives them
specialist expertise in products liability and a base in modern
cases. Neither Restatement’s treatment of prescription drugs
provides effective support for near-total products liability
immunity, however.
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14 C 1748MDL No. 2545, 2017
WL 1836435, at *19 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (confirming that California,
Tennessee, and Oregon “appear to have adopted” comment k).
104. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (2017) (codifying the substance of section
402A of the Second Restatement); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (2012)
(codifying section 402A).
105. David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The
Curious Case of the “Flagrant Trespasser”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1457
(2011).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY intro. (AM.
LAW. INST. 1998) (acknowledging that when drafting the Third Restatement, the
“Institute had before it thousands of judicial decisions that had fine-tuned the
law of products liability in a manner hardly imaginable when Restatement
Second was written”).
107. OWEN, supra note 20, at 255–56.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998).
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1. The Original Restatement
Liability provisioned in § 402A “extends to any product sold
in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it
is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer.” 109 Some
examples: “an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a
water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a
chair, and an insecticide.” 110 What about a prescription drug?
Here the acclaimed text becomes—and remains—coy.
Prescription drugs as an object of regulation through liability
turn up only in one of the comments to Section 402A, and the
category is not labeled clearly. “Unavoidably unsafe products,”
begins comment k: “There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs.” 111 Comment k then
names as its example of this category the rabies vaccine
developed in 1885 by the great French microbiologist Louis
Pasteur: “Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.” 112 And then come the only explicit
references to prescription drugs in the Second Restatement: “The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.” 113
The products liability scholars who worked to supersede this
provision have written that “Comment k to § 402A of the
Restatement, Second, of Torts has caused confusion in
prescription drug litigation, seemingly without end. Bidding
farewell to Comment k is both justifiable and overdue.” 114 Hard to
disagree, starting with the caption of “unavoidably unsafe
products.” If we grant that the category exists, how do we know
whether a particular product should be classified there? Prosser’s
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
110. Id. cmt. d.
111. Id. cmt. k.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability:
Farewell to Comment k, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 521, 522 (2015).
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poorly bounded diction—phrasing like “many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like” and “many of which”—invites courts to
regard prescription drugs as unavoidably unsafe but also permits
them to reach a contrary conclusion. Paralleling the awkward
drafting of Section 402A blackletter, which condemns “any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,”
comment k says an unavoidably unsafe product “is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous.” What does this disjunctive
mean? Is there a difference between being defective and being
unreasonably dangerous? The text does not say. 115
To the writers of the rival younger Restatement, the central
wrongness of comment k lies in its misdescription of everything
in products liability, not just the subset ostensibly identified in
the exception it asserts. Comment k begins with “Unavoidably
unsafe products” as its banner and then says a fraction of
products fall into under this rubric. 116 Actually all of them do,
Henderson and Twerski argue: “All products carry with them
categorical risks of injury that cannot be eliminated by re-design
without destroying the product's utility.” 117 In other words, “not
just some products”—the category that comment k purports to
talk about—“but all products, are categorically dangerous.” 118
115. In an article-length critique of comment k that goes beyond prescription
drugs, still salient despite its advanced age, Joseph Page explains some of the
incoherence of this comment with reference to drafting history inside the ALI.
See Page, supra note 95, at 864 (suggesting that the genesis of comment k may
help explain its blurred distinctions and “other mysteries”). Disagreement about
whether to exempt prescription drugs from § 402A liability divided participants.
Id. at 865–66. Members of the ALI introduced motions to write exemptions into
the blackletter and the comments, all of which failed to pass. Id. Prosser drafted
comment k after these proceedings, but what he wrote was neither a
compromise between two positions nor a clarification of the debate. Id. at
864 – 68. James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, who jettisoned this provision,
speculate that Prosser found the gray-zone status of a comment, neither a stark
rule nor an exclusion, politically expedient when he worked to get his bold
Restatement approved. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 529 n.30
(“Restatement Reporters have, on occasion, agreed to address an issue in a
[c]omment in order to bolster political support among the ALI membership for
more salient positions in the black letter.”).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST.
1965) (“There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use.”).
117. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 526.
118. Id. at 527.
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From there new layers of errors follow. Prosser captioned his
comment “unavoidably unsafe products” rather than “prescription
drugs.” This diction choice made an open question about whether
prescription drugs—some of them? all? most?—fall under the
comment k nonliability rule with respect to design defect. The
best-known judicial decision on this issue, issued by the
California Supreme Court in 1988, concluded that all prescription
drugs qualify as unavoidably unsafe products and thus are
exempt from design defect liability. 119 But comment k does not
say so explicitly, and other courts disagree. 120
The trouble with comment k does not stop with the lack of
clarity in it that rises to the level of incoherence. Restatements do
not themselves change decisional law. Like a bad law review
article or an unsound assertion in a treatise, problematic drafting
in these works starts out as harmless error, so to speak. The
living, ongoing, vital trouble with comment k is that judges still
like what it has to say about liability for defective prescription
drugs. Multiple decades after its publication—and also two
decades after the ALI supplanted it with new Restatement
blackletter—they cite it as authority. This implicit tribute is an
honor for secondary writing deep in its middle age, but it
confounds judges and lawyers who need answers.
2. The Newer Restatement
In contrast to the elusive, hard-to-parse comment k of the
Second Restatement, Section 6 of the Third Restatement offers a
full and cogent treatment of prescription drug liability. It has five
subsections. The first announces that defective products of this
119. See Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988) (concluding
that “a manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription
drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of
its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably scientifically
knowable at the time of distribution”).
120. See, e.g., Moss v. Wyeth Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 162, 174 (D. Conn. 2012)
(deciding that the comment k exemption “applies on a case-by-case basis”);
Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 585 S.E. 2d 723, 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he
Brown decision reflects the minority view among those jurisdictions to have
considered the language of [c]omment k.”); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189,
1193 (Alaska 1992) (declining to adopt Brown); Toner v. Lederle Labs, 732 P.2d
297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (refusing to find that comment k applies to all drugs).
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category give rise to liability. 121 The second reiterates the
tripartite conception of defect that pervades this Restatement:
manufacturing defect, defective design, and inadequate
instructions or warnings. 122 The third, Section 6(c), offers a novel
standard for design defect: A prescription drug is defectively
designed only if “reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.” 123
The fourth covers warning, 124 and the fifth subsection discusses
retailers as sellers. 125 All blackletter in this section is clear.
The trouble with the Third Restatement lies in its “any class
of patients” subsection, which has gained by far the most
scholarly attention of the five. 126 While a prominent drug scholar
gives it high praise, contending that if this rule has a
shortcoming it is its insufficient attention to the interests of
manufacturers, 127 most of this literature has expressed
disagreement. 128 One scholar-critic calls its bottom line “overly
protective of manufacturers.” 129
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(a) (AM.
LAW. INST. 1998) (“A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who
sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to
liability for harm to persons caused by the defect.”).
122. Id. § 6(b).
123. Id. § 6(c). On this literature, see OWEN, supra note 20, at 548–60
(gathering numerous citations from law reviews).
124. Id. § 6(d).
125. Id. § 6(e).
126. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1104 (2000) (“Academic
commentators criticized the ALI's proposed rule for drugs as setting a
‘super-negligence’ standard of liability.”); Dustin R. Marlowe, Note, A Dose of
Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39
GA. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2005) (noting that the provision has received an
“onslaught of criticism that questioned the provision's soundness and legitimacy
in various law reviews and journals”).
127. See Lars D. Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on
Drugs, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 839, 848 (2009) (phrasing this point as “incomplete
protection against inappropriate claims of defective design”).
128. See, e.g., Conk, supra note 126, at 1118 (discussing the shortcomings of
a special liability regime for medical products); George W. Conk, The True Test:
Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a
Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 737 (2002) (opining that the
new Restatement’s broader construction of design defect is inadequate); Richard
L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The
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Henderson and Twerski started their Restatement work
favoring complete and explicit immunity on design defect for this
product. 130 They were going to recognize the other two types of
defect for prescription drugs—manufacturing and warning—but
deny judicial redress for design claims. 131 They softened their
stance in the rule they eventually composed. 132 Section 6(c) of the
Third Restatement makes it very difficult—though not quite
impossible—for a plaintiff to bring this type of claim.
In contrast to what one finds in the law journals,
judge-written writings on Section 6(c) cannot be called a rich
literature. Courts had time before the 1998 issuance of the Third
Restatement to absorb the teaching of this rule: in a
pre-publication period, drafts of the entire Restatement
circulated among the bench and bar. 133 Judges have not accepted
Section 6(c) and they have not engaged with it much. 134 Here I
review the record of thirty-two decisions. 135
Restatement (Third) Approach Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 76, 80 (1994) (criticizing an early version of the Restatement's approach);
Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 207 (1999) (calling
the § 6(c) standard “idiosyncratic” and arguing for more attention to § 6(d), on
warnings); Marlowe, supra note 126, at 1446 (suggesting that the belief that the
new standard would promote uniformity in the law has yet to come to fruition).
129. Cupp, supra note 128, at 80.
130. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,
1543 (1992) (noting that comment k exempts all prescription drugs from design
claims).
131. See id. at 1536 (stating that their “first alternative version of comment
k reflects a disposition to exclude judicial inquiry”).
132. See id. at 1514 (allowing for manufacturer liability for design defect
under certain conditions).
133. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the
Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 668 n.2 (1998)
(describing years of discussion among sixty members “drawn from the bench,
bar, and academia”).
134. See Marlowe, supra note 126, at 1467 (opining that courts have failed to
thoroughly consider or adopt Section 6(c)).
135. This record reached me first via a data set of thirty decisions curated by
Aaron D. Twerski, current as of December 2017. Two new cases joined the list
following Westlaw searches in September 2019. I thank Elaina Mansley for her
assistance in the task of updating. Eight decisions are designated as
unpublished; continuing to cast my net wide, see supra Part II.A., for the sake of
including all available judge-written treatments of Section 6(c) in case law, I
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Only one constituent of decisional law contains full-throated
enthusiasm for Section 6(c). 136 In it the presiding judge of the
Georgia Court of Appeals advocates for acceptance of Section 6(c);
contrasts its rule favorably to its Second Restatement
predecessor, comment k; quotes Drug Designs are Different, 137 the
extended Henderson and Twerski defense of their rule, at some
length; and justifies the choice of the Third Restatement to use
risk-utility balancing as the test for design defect for most
products while providing a separate rule for prescription drugs. 138
Judge Andrews did everything that careful and hard-working
Reporters could want done with their blackletter, in short. But
the Andrews opinion in Bryant is a concurrence; its embrace of
Section 6(c) does not speak for the court.
Next most supportive of the design-defect test provisioned by
Section 6(c) in the data set are decisions that say nothing bad
about it. Courts write that their state has accepted the larger
Third Restatement and so they are willing to go along with
Section 6(c). 139 Arizona is prominent here. Five judicial decisions
say that Arizona accepts the Restatement, good enough; 140 one
include them.
136. See Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 585 S.E. 2d 723, 731–34 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (Andrews, J., concurring) (discussing § 6(c) at length and urging its
adoption as the test for prescription drug design defects).
137. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114.
138. See Bryant, 585 S.E.2d at 734 (“The test for prescription drug design
defects set forth in . . . § 6(c) establishes a better reasoned alternative to the
design defect test adopted by the majority . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037
(E.D. Mo. 2007) (acknowledging that Missouri has adopted the Third
Restatement).
140. See D’Agnese v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 880, 889 n.7
(D. Ariz. 2013) (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Torts); Gebhardt v. Mentor
Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999) (“[A]lthough no Arizona case has
formally adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Arizona has demonstrated a
willingness to look to the Restatement (Third) as the current statement of the
law.” (internal citation omitted)); Staub v. Breg, Inc., No. CV 10-02038, 2012 WL
1078335, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting the Restatement (Third) of
Torts); Placencia v. I-Flow Corp., No. CV 10-2520, 2012 WL 5877624, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 20, 2012) (“Courts in this District apply the Restatement (Third) of
Torts to medical device design defect claims.” (internal citation omitted)); Mills
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. CV 11-00968, 2011 WL 4708850, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 7, 2011) (“Although plaintiff’s design defect claim is pled pursuant to
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a), this no longer appears to be the correct
standard . . . .”).
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expresses skepticism about Section 6. 141 One approval of Section
6(c) in a footnote talks only about the learned intermediary
doctrine, not defective design. 142 An Iowa Supreme Court
concurrence-and-dissent cites Section 6(c) with approval, but only
to say that this blackletter establishes a “duty of care to balance
risks and benefits of prescription drugs with respect to design.” 143
Risk-utility balancing was what the Reporters wrote Section 6(c)
to reject, not to impose. A New York federal trial court mentions
Section 6(c) by-the-bye as an example of federally-regulated
products in tort litigation. 144 An Iowa federal trial court observes
that both the plaintiff and the defendant cited Section 6(c) when
disagreeing about an affirmative defense, but the decision does
not engage with the substance of this blackletter. 145 This cluster
of case law expresses no approval of the Reporters’ choice on
design defect, and the content of Section 6(c) has no effect on the
results. 146
The last group of cases expresses mild hostility toward
Section 6(c). In Tersingi v. Wyeth, 147 the First Circuit refused to
apply Section 6(c) but did so in response to an eccentric reading of
it as supposedly more pro-plaintiff than the risk-utility test. 148 In
an unpublished federal decision, defendants urged the trial court
141. See Harrison v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. CIV 06-0745, 2008 WL
615886, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2008) (requiring supplemental briefing on the
applicability of Section 6(c)).
142. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1223 n.6 (D.N.M.
2008).
143. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc. 850 N.W.2d 353, 394 (Iowa 2014) (Hecht, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
144. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438
F. Supp. 2d 291, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ruling that federal regulation will not
preclude a products liability action).
145. See Nicholson v. Biomet, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 931, 937 (N.D. Iowa
2019) (limiting discussion of Section 6(c) to the parties’ briefs on the issue).
Nicholson, an action complaining about an artificial hip joint, mentions
prescription drugs nowhere. Id. at 935.
146. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 394; Adams, 576 So. 2d at 732; In re
MBTE Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01; Nicholson, 363 F. Supp. 3d
at 937.
147. 817 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2016).
148. See id. at 369 (“Tersigni asks us to assume . . . that Massachusetts
courts would recognize his negligent design claim, . . . and those same courts
would grant a heretofore unrecognized exception to the general requirement of
proof of a reasonable alternative design.”).
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to embrace Section 6(c), in response to which the court wrote that
“the standard set forth in § 402A, as interpreted in recent
Colorado Supreme Court cases, remains the governing standard
as to a design defect theory.” 149 In another unpublished federal
court decision—this one from Texas—defendants also pointed to
Section 6(c) to support their position, but the court would not
accept it because its own “research had failed to unearth any
Texas or Fifth Circuit authority applying the standard
articulated in § 6(c) in the context of a design defect claim.” 150 A
couple of years later, a West Virginia federal court said the same
thing: Texas law does not accept Section 6(c). 151 Going further, a
Florida federal court refused to apply Section 6(c) while
acknowledging that Florida had accepted the Restatement test
for design defect for other products. 152
A few courts have expressed open antipathy to the design
defect test of Section 6(c). The Southern District of New York,
refusing to apply its “any class of patients” test, 153 along the way
called the Restatement “a treatise” in a tone that did not sound
complimentary: “As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Court
is hesitant to stitch into decades of Florida tort law one section of
a treatise that its courts have shown no apparent interest in
adopting over the past twelve years.” 154
149. Lynch v. Olympus America, No. 18-cv-00512, 2018 WL 5619327, at *9
n.7 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2018). Like Nicholson, Lynch is a medical device case. Id.
at *1–2.
150. Lea v. Wyeth LLC, No. 1:03-CV-1339, 2011 WL 13192701, at *12 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 28, 2011).
151. See In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair, Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186869, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2014) (rejecting
Ethicon’s contention that because several Texas cases rely on the Restatement
(Third) regarding general products liability claims, Section 6(c) should be
applied).
152. See Tillman v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1345 (M.D. Fla.
2015) (“[R]egardless of whether the Third Restatement applies under Florida
law in other contexts, in a medical device case such as this, Florida law does not
apply this [i.e. Section 6(c)’s] standard.”).
153. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (specifying that the “any class of patients” test is met when the
“foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug are so high in comparison to the
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable
risks . . . would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients”).
154. Id. at 472.
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The best-known reception of Section 6(c) in the courts is
blunt speech from the Nebraska Supreme Court: “We conclude
that § 6(c) has no basis in the case law. We view § 6(c) as too
strict of a rule, under which recovery would be nearly impossible.
Accordingly, we do not adopt § 6(c) of the Third Restatement.” 155
The opinion for the court in Bryant, mentioned above to note a
concurrence that contains the most pro-Section 6(c)
judicially-authored language in the United States, 156 agreed with
this bottom line, summarizing the Nebraska condemnation:
In particular, § 6(c) has been criticized for its failure to reflect
existing case law, its lack of flexibility with regard to drugs
involving differing benefits and risks, its unprecedented
application of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact
that a consumer’s claim could easily be defeated by expert
opinion that the drug had some use for someone, despite
potentially harmful effects on a large class of individuals. 157

This negative reception should itself be received with
caution. Judicial aversion to Section 6(c) does not mean that
Section 6(c) gets design-defect law wrong. 158 Authors of opinions
citing this blackletter do not know as much about products
liability as the Reporters of the Restatement.
Shakiness here, in my view, is not substantive error within
the Restatement but rather its lack of guidance for courts.
Decisions about liability ought ideally to align with blackletter
that judges and litigators consume to inform their work. No such
guidance is present in doctrinal material that is still academic, so
to speak, after having had more than twenty years to win judicial
followers.
In sum, both the original treatment of products liability in
the Restatement of Torts and its 1998 successor have in different
155. Freeman v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000).
156. See supra notes 136 and 138 and accompanying text (discussing the
Andrews concurrence praising Section 6(c)).
157. Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003) (citing Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 840).
158. See Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as
Products Liability Reform: Wyeth, Rigel, Altria, and the Restatement (Third)’s
Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 755–58
(2009) (arguing that just because courts have not looked fondly upon Section 6(c)
does not mean the provision does not accurately capture courts’ “general pulse”
on design defect).
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ways proved unsatisfactory as sources of guidance to courts. The
Second Restatement’s contribution to drug law is incoherent and
has sowed confusion in American courts; the Third Restatement
has failed to convince judges of its correctness. By including
pharma-favoring doctrines, the Restatements have, however,
helped to underscore a message that one particular product ought
to be spared the hardships of products liability. This work has
been functional enough to enlarge immunity.
B. Preemption as Insulation from Liability
American drug regulation has to live with a risk that
oversight or even deceit by manufacturers will cause the agency
in charge, the Food and Drug Administration, to approve or
condone the sale of dangerous products. 159 Any regulatory design
that depends on candor, accuracy, and diligence from the
regulated sector needs safeguards against omissions and
misstatement. Liability has traditionally been one such
safeguard, but preemption impedes this opportunity to make
prescription drugs safer. 160
When accepted as an affirmative defense in court,
preemption decrees that a drug-defect plaintiff will receive no
relief, no matter how defective or dangerous the pharmaceutical
product may be. 161 Obliteration of what would otherwise be a
good legal claim is powerful medicine, and so one would think it
needs a good reason to exist. At least in principle, state (tort) and
federal (regulatory) law bring separate strengths to the task of
159. See Mary J. Davis, Time for a Fresh Look at Strict Liability for
Pharmaceuticals, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 436–37 (2019) (noting
pressure from the pharmaceutical industry on the FDA).
160. See id. at 422 (“Federal preemption of state product[s] liability laws has
dramatically limited the ability of consumers injured by pharmaceuticals to
recover for those injuries . . . .”); see also David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 413 (2003) (“[A]ny state law that
in fact interferes with the operation of a federal statue or regulation thereunder
contravenes the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.”).
161. See Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir.
1999) (recognizing preemption as an affirmative defense); see also Owen, supra
note 160, at 413 (discussing the effect of preemption in pharmaceutical products
liability cases).
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protecting health and safety. 162 And again in principle, a
presumption against preemption holds up the state-law half of
this partnership. 163
The United States Supreme Court has issued several
decisions on preemption of personal injury claims against
prescription drug manufacturers. 164 The first of them ruled in
favor of an injured plaintiff, holding that the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act did not preempt a state-law failure to warn
Because
FDA
regulations
expressly
permit
claim. 165
manufacturers to alter an agency-approved drug warning
unilaterally to reflect newly acquired information about risks and
safety, the Court concluded that “impossibility preemption”—the
kind of preemption that blocks a personal injury claim because
the defendant could not have given the warning the plaintiff
wanted while complying with what the FDA ordered at the same
time 166—did not bar a patient from seeking tort redress in the
Vermont courts. 167 And so it appeared in 2009 that preemption
doctrine has room for judicial redress of the injuries that
prescription drugs cause.
Two other Supreme Court drug-preemption decisions,
however, soon went on to block this opportunity. PLIVA, Inc. v.
Messing 168 held in 2011 that failure-to-warn claims are
162. See Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs,
Preemption, and the Potential for a No-fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 797, 797–98 (2011) (describing the relationship as “symbiotic”).
163. Like the separate-strengths premise, the presumption against
preemption is honored in the breach. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968, 1028 (2002)
(attributing the “supposed presumption against preemption of state regulation”
to the states’ traditional police powers).
164. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 487 (2013); PLIVA,
Inc. v. Messing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581
(2009).
165. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claim did not
“obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling”).
166. See Michael M. Gallagher, Clear Evidence of Impossibility Preemption
After Wyeth v. Levine, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 439, 476 (2016) (explaining that to
succeed on an impossibility preemption, a drug company must demonstrate that
complying with both federal and state regulation cannot be done).
167. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (“Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it
was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements.”).
168. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
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preempted when the injurious drug is generic rather than
brand-name, 169 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 170
decided two years later, concluded that design-defect claims
against generic-drug manufacturers are also preempted. 171
Eighty percent of drug prescriptions are for generics. 172 The
pro-plaintiff holding in Wyeth, addressing the brand-name drug
Phenergan, landed on a manufacturer in the minority. 173
Lower courts continue this work of redress-blocking in their
holdings on state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims, where an injured
consumer seeks to show that informed expertise did not guide
approval of the defendant’s drug. 174 Misstatements or material
omissions made initially in a new-drug application, or later on in
reports about adverse experiences, could steer the agency from
the disapproval or prohibition that it would have chosen absent
this intentional conduct by a manufacturer. 175 The reason for
preemption is deference to agency competence, not judicial
support for dishonesty. 176 And yet federal circuit courts, instead
of uniting around preemption’s central value and rejecting
extensions of the doctrine that abet deceit, are split on
169. See id. at 613, 626 (“[B]rand-name and generic drug manufacturers
have different federal drug labeling duties.”).
170. 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
171. See id. at 487, 493.
172. Robert C. Baker III, Requiem for a Remedy: The Law and Economics of
Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett’s Over-Preemption, 74 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES
81, 81–82 (2015).
173. See id. at 106 (explaining that even the FDA took notice of the
“arbitrary disparity” resulting from Wyeth and PLIVA).
174. See, e.g., Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672 F.3d 372,
379 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff’s theory of
fraud rested solely on the FDA disclosure requirements).
175. For a different judicial concern on point, see Jennifer A. Surprenant,
Note, Should Preemption Apply in a Pharmaceutical Context? An Analysis of the
Preemption Debate and What Regulatory Compliance Statutes Contribute to the
Discussion, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 359 n.250 (2008) (noting the Supreme
Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), was
concerned that requiring too much disclosure would burden the FDA in
subsequent approvals). In Buckman, the plaintiffs complained of injuries
resulting from the use of orthopedic bone screws. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343. The
Court concluded that state law fraud-on-the-FDA claims “inevitably conflict
with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the
Administration’s judgment and objectives.” Id. at 350.
176. Baker, supra note 172, at 89.
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preemption of state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims. 177 Cases
finding preemption of prescription drug claims extend a 2001
Supreme Court decision about fraud-on-the-FDA claims with
respect to medical devices. 178 Medical device claims are expressly
preempted, however, and drug claims are not. 179
If skeptics on the federal bench fear that plaintiffs’ lawyers
will fling fraud accusations at defendants without care or
justification, preemption by judicial inference (rather than by the
express version of preemption) is not the solution to this problem.
Twenty-first century federal pleading rules discourage litigation
abuse of this stripe. 180 If these safeguards are for any reason
insufficient, robust sanctions of attorney (and client) misconduct
add more deterrence. 181 Applying preemption to block claims of
fraud on the only agency with enough expertise to deliver safety
and effectiveness in prescription drugs harms a carefully formed
regulatory design and increases the risk of injury to persons who
depend on these products. 182
The preemption trendline has moved in only one direction
since the early years of the century that brought Wyeth v. Levine.
In 2002, the FDA for the first time in its hundred-year history
177. Compare Garcia v. Wyeth Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir.
2004) (preempted), and Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672
F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (same), with Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.,
467 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir. 2006) (not preempted); see also Christine A. Gaddis,
Buckman Extended: Federal Preemption of State Fraud on the FDA Statutes, 69
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 113, 125–35 (2014) (evaluating the circuit split).
178. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001)
(holding plaintiffs’ state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with federal
law and were thus “impliedly pre-empted”).
179. See Gaddis, supra note 177, at 116 (“The M[edical] D[evice]
A[mendments] include[] an express preemption provision relating to medical
devices.”).
180. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (2010) (commenting
on the end of “notice pleading,” which permits plaintiffs to assert claims
relatively easily, and the rise of summary judgment for defendants).
181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (establishing sanctions in litigation); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (provisioning a
disciplinary rule on “meritorious claims and contentions”).
182. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The
FDA’s Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 DEPAUL L.
REV. 343, 344–45 (2019) (recognizing that the regulatory design and oversight
allows the FDA to both promote health and safety and create innovative policy).
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announced that its prescription drug regulations preempt
personal injury claims. 183 Before 2002, the agency had taken the
position that liability and regulation provide complementary,
rather than conflicting, sources of consumer protection. 184 As for
Wyeth, in 2019 the Supreme Court narrowed its generosity to
plaintiffs with a follow-up decision that enlarged impossibility
preemption. 185
The FDA’s ability to keep defectively-designed drugs from
the market—and, going beyond design, to protect the consuming
public from preventable harms caused by prescription
drugs—depends on conditions that are separate from its good
faith and regulatory competence. The agency needs adequate
funding, independence from the sector it regulates, and the power
to
write
meaningful
standards
that
support
its
safety-and-effectiveness statutory mandate. 186 Preemption
notwithstanding, it needs the complimentary function of tort
183. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090–91 (2007) (explaining that
state common law typically does not “treat federally approved prescription drug
labeling as conclusive on the question of the label’s adequacy”).
184. See id. at 1094–95 (“Before 2002, the FDA maintained the position that
its product approval process and state tort liability usually operate
independently—each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer
protection.”).
185. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679
(2019) (concluding that so long as the FDA is acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority, FDA labeling standards preempt state
law). This outcome was anticipated. See Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Considers
Whether Drug Companies Can Poison Patients and Get Away with It,
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 4, 2019, 9:25 AM), http://perma.cc/P6ZY-L3T3 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2019) (“There is a very good chance that it was actually impossible for
Merck to comply with both federal and state law.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
186. See Alison R. McCabe, A Precarious Balancing Act—The Role of the
FDA as Protector of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
787, 814 (2003) (“A lack of adequate funding to support the FDA’s various
functions and its specialized staff frustrates the agency’s achievement of this
balance.”); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Compensating Pharmaceutical Injuries in
the Absence of Fault, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 447, 459 n.54 (2014) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckman was largely attributed to protecting
the FDA’s independence); Ariele Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for
Organic Products: How the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market
Solution to an Organic Transparency Problem, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
415, 464 (2011) (emphasizing the need for manageable standards in
supplemental label regulation).
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liability to deliver what agency competence cannot supply on its
own. 187 The trajectory of these necessary accompaniments is in
decline.
C. Causation Doctrine as a Barrier to Redress
Pharmaceutical products illustrate how causation as an
element of the products liability prima facie case advantages
defendants and disadvantages plaintiffs. A consumer who can
show that a drug is defective has more work to do before she
wins: She must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defect caused the consequence she experienced. 188 Drugs almost
never inflict a signature harm. When they increase risks of
injury, whatever they cause usually could have occurred without
exposure to the drug. 189 Exposure and injury are not enough for
courts to conclude that the former caused the later. 190
Vioxx offers an example of the problem. According to expert
estimates, tens of thousands of individuals, perhaps 139,000,
“suffered cardiac arrests that they would not have suffered
absent Vioxx exposure. But who?” 191 Personal injury doctrine
applies the preponderance standard to conclude that nobody may
recover. 192 Merck had a different experience with Vioxx, of course,
187. See Davis, supra note 183, at 1091 (“[M]ore exacting state tort law
standards of care do not conflict, but operate concurrently with the federal
requirements.”).
188. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir.
1988) (describing each individual plaintiff’s responsibility to show “his or her
specific injuries or damages were proximately caused” by the defendant).
189. See id. at 1235–36 (emphasizing the importance of physicians’
differential diagnosis testimony in proving specific causation); Michel Auriche &
Elizabeth Loupi, Does Proof of Causality Ever Exist in Pharmacovigilance?, 9
DRUG SAFETY 230, 230 (1993) (illustrating the non-uniqueness of drug defect
injuries).
190. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm:
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 419, 438 (2010) (explaining that correlation studies are useful, but
insufficient to show causation).
191. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 49
(2019).
192. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1203
(2011) (“[T]he preponderance standard typically defines that [proof of innocence]
quantum in personal injury actions.”).
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and agreed to a $4.85 billion settlement after losing a few
bellwether trials that followed aggregation. 193
Going down the MDL road with a large settlement at the end
of the journey is an exception rather than the rule, however. Most
plaintiffs are stuck with doctrine that leaves them
uncompensated when they cannot fulfill an element of their claim
and once again we see Almost No Bad Drugs as a bottom-line
result accounted for with reference to a barrier that seems
neutral. Plaintiffs lose because courts apply preemption doctrine
to their claims, we learned, and because Restatement blackletter
makes it hard for them to win. 194 Now they lose also because their
claims fail on causation.
Must they? Different causation doctrine—like different
decisional law on preemption and different Restatement
rules—would permit these persons to succeed. Denying
compensation for harm whose existence is certain in the
aggregate on the ground that individual plaintiffs cannot prove
that the harm happened to them not only disadvantages hurt
persons but also nurtures pollution and social disutility. 195
Scholars have proposed alternatives to the pro-defendant
causation status quo. 196 In addition to the untaken option of
contrary tort rules, different understandings of professional
responsibility could require defense lawyers, consistent with their
duty of candor to the court, to acknowledge that a dangerous drug
caused injury at large notwithstanding the absence of evidence
that it injured a particular individual. 197
193. Engstrom, supra note 191, at 51.
194. See supra Parts III.A and III.B.
195. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 775–76 (1997).
196. See, e.g., id. at 833–40 (developing a standard that would (1) place the
initial burden on manufacturers to show that they have conducted “minimal
safety testing” on their products and (2) entitle plaintiffs to a presumption that
an insufficiently tested product caused the harm); Engstrom, supra note 191, at
49 n.205 (giving as examples explicitly probabilistic causation, abandonment of
the entire element of the prima facia case, and replacement of tort with a
legislative-administrative compensation program).
197. See Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial
Tactics, the Court System, and the Role of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 525–30 (2008) (juxtaposing the competing responsibilities
of candor to the court and loyalty to the client).
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Causation doctrine is the subtlest of the three sources of
near-total products liability immunity for pharmaceuticals
surveyed here. The Third Restatement and the rise of preemption
have long been characterized in law review writing as
tendentious activism that favors defendants. 198 Both the Third
Restatement and vigorous preemption are younger than the old
school negligence prima facie case, 199 which makes their political
antecedents easier to observe. Saddling plaintiffs with the cost of
uncertainty or ignorance about causation appears on the surface
conservative in a less partisan sense of the term.
IV. Questionable Beliefs and Premises Support the Supports
To review: Doctrinal barriers between injured consumers and
redress in court surveyed in the last Part are not fixed facts of
nature. Alternatives to all three of them—that is, oppositions to
Restatement stances, preemption in its current ascendancy, and
causation as a burden on plaintiffs—amply exist. 200 I move here
to a second-order explanation of near-total products liability
immunity for pharmaceuticals. Why these anti-plaintiff
conditions persist in the face of articulate and principled
opposition is the subject of this Part, whose headings recite shaky
beliefs.

198. See, e.g., George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A
Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 804–06
(2007) (arguing that the Third Restatement’s revision of products liability has
fallen especially severely on consumers of medical products); Catherine M.
Sharkey, The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme
Court: The Business Community Weighs In, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 805, 835–36
(2017) (adverting to a strong stance on preemption of drug and medical device
claims by the Product Liability Advisory Council, a trade association of
manufacturers).
199. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 470–72 (2d
ed. 1985) (discussing the history of modern causation doctrine); Robert Cary,
Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault Between Negligent Parties
in Minnesota—Daly v. McFarland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 275, 278 (2012)
(remarking that the history of this prima facie case spans many years and court
decisions).
200. See supra Parts III.A–III.C.

40

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020)

A. “We Don’t Need Liability, Because Consumers Can’t Buy This
Product Without a Learned Permission Slip.”
Federal law in the United States provides that a prospective
user needs permission from a licensed prescriber before she can
buy a prescription drug. 201 Mandatory cooperation from a
well-informed third party to make sales of this product lawful
suggests that dangerous products can—again, at least in
principle—be kept from harming consumers without any need for
judicial condemnation. 202 Personal injury law that governs other
products presupposes only a willing seller and buyer as needed to
deliver an object alleged to have caused injury. Most of the time,
nobody stands between the decision to sell and the impulse to
buy.
This pillar underlying current law posits a barrier that
distinguishes this product from others. Working at a professional
distance from both buyer and seller, an expert has the power to
veto a purchase of this good. Physicians and nurse practitioners
who fulfill this barrier role with discernment and vigilance fend
off danger. If consumers can acquire this product and ingest it
without the learned approval that federal law demands, a
premise about safety gets weaker.
They can. Strong evidence for the scalable prescription wall
comes from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the federal
agency tasked with assessing costs and benefits of federal
policy. 203 The GAO has investigated breaches of the prescription
wall between drug buyers and sellers. 204 Vendors sell prescription
drugs to customers who lack prescriptions, the GAO has
confirmed. 205 They also dispense prescriptions that are sham in
201. 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2018).
202. Cf. KATHRYN B. ARMSTRONG & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43609, ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: SELECT
LEGAL ISSUES 3–6 (2018) (explaining federal agency enforcement as provided in
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
203. See About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACC. OFFICE, https://perma.cc/HSJ2-M828
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
204. See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-01-69, INTERNET PHARMACIES: ADDING
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS WOULD AID STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 10–11
(2000), https://perma.cc/P4SF-SXNB (PDF) [hereinafter GAO DISCLOSURE]
(detailing the GAO investigation).
205. See id. at 11 (explaining that at least twenty-five internet pharmacies
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the sense of originating with these vendors rather than the
buyer’s physician and lacking attention to the welfare of the
buyer as a patient. 206 In a series of separate reports, all titled
“Internet Pharmacies” followed by a subtitle, the GAO has
focused mostly on problems other than the scalable prescription
wall (for example counterfeit drugs and authentic but inadvisable
drugs sold online, 207 and the difficulty of holding offshore
suppliers to United States law 208) but along the way it has
confirmed the widely held belief that what one needs to buy
prescription drugs is less a doctor’s note than a browser and a
credit card. 209
If you, Reader, want proof of a sort about widespread
distribution of prescription drugs away from oversight by
patients’ physicians, peek at the spam that your web-based
e-mail account filtered lately. I am writing about a fast-changing
issue and so this generalization may be obsolete by the time you
read it, but at the moment prescription drugs have been flogged
aggressively online for decades without letup. 210 A research
assistant generously risked drawing unwanted electronic
attention to himself (I did warn him about the danger 211) by
included in the GAO study dispensed prescription drugs without prescriptions).
206. See id. at 12–13 (“The ability to buy prescription drugs from Internet
pharmacies not licensed in the state where the customer is located and without
appropriate physician supervision, including an examination, means that
important safeguards related to the doctor/patient relationship and intrinsic to
conventional prescribing are bypassed.”).
207. See id. at 11 (“Internet pharmacies place consumers at risk from
counterfeit or unapproved drugs, or drugs that were manufactured or stored
under poor conditions.”).
208. See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-14-386T, INTERNET PHARMACIES: MOST
ROGUE SITES OPERATE FROM ABROAD, AND MANY SELL COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 4–5
(2014), https://perma.cc/F49G-H73U (PDF) (describing the mechanisms rogue
internet pharmacies use to evade customs officials).
209. See GAO DISCLOSURE, supra note 204, at 11 (highlighting that
individuals were able to obtain prescriptions with as little information as a
credit card).
210. See Robert F. Forman, Narcotics on the Net: The Availability of
Websites Selling Controlled Substances, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 24, 25 (2006)
(characterizing illicit online drug sales as a challenge for substance-abuse
treatment).
211. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (assembling
evidence that businesses gather data about what individuals search and then
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typing “ambien without prescription” and “viagra without
prescription” into the search box in the upper right corner of his
computer screen. His hit count was 3.6 million and 5.2 million
respectively. Your mileage will vary but everyone’s total will be
large.
Some attempts to scale the prescription wall with an internet
connection admittedly do fail. 212 The GAO found gaps between
the number of purported sellers and the quantities of drugs
delivered. 213 One of its studies identified thirteen popular
prescription drugs, including the opioids OxyContin and
Percocet—as well as blander stuff like Lipitor—and set out to
place up to ten orders of each product from an array of online
pharmacies located both inside and outside the U.S. 214 The GAO
obtained sixty-eight units in its harvest, representing eleven of
the thirteen drugs, but did not receive six orders it had paid
for. 215
Even taking into account this failure rate, however, the
GAO’s research provides ample data to refute the pillar-premise
that prudent and well-schooled intermediaries familiar with their
patients’ bodies shelter them from the consequences of an
improvident desire to buy and consume a dangerous product.
“Most of the drugs—45 of 68—were obtained without a
patient-provided prescription.” 216 The GAO designed its study to
include drugs that call particularly for learned-intermediary
attention because their side effects can be severe or their
exploit this information for profit).
212. See GAO DISCLOSURE, supra note 204, at 14 (describing increased
enforcement efforts by the Justice Department).
213. See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-04-888T, INTERNET PHARMACIES: SOME
POSE SAFETY RISKS FOR CONSUMERS AND ARE UNRELIABLE IN THEIR BUSINESS
PRACTICES 4 (2004), https://perma.cc/BP2N-6L2X (PDF) [hereinafter GAO
BUSINESS PRACTICES] (noting that researchers were able to obtain the “majority”
but not all of the requested prescriptions).
214. See id. at 2 (explaining that most Internet pharmacies purported or
appeared to be located in the United States, Canada, “and other foreign
countries”).
215. See id. at 17 (noting that the six unreceived orders “were for Clozaril,
Humulin N, and Vicodin, and cost over $700 in total”). Several of the shipments
arrived in shaky shape, without necessary temperature controls or in punctured
blister packs. Id. at 4–5.
216. Id. at 7.
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potential for abuse and addiction is high. 217 Buyers easily scaled
the prescription wall to acquire drugs that really do need a
barrier between demand and supply for the sake of safety, in
short, at least circa 2004 when the GAO published “Business
Practices.” In the ensuing decade and a half, no significant
change to law and regulation has made prescription drugs harder
to buy without a learned permission slip.
Consumers scale the prescription wall not only by buying
online but also by traveling. In 1992 the now defunct (but
peer-reviewed and to this day respectably indexed on the
National Institutes of Health website) Western Journal of
Medicine published a study by two El Paso-based physicians who
investigated their patients’ habit of crossing the border to acquire
prescription medications. 218 Most respondents surveyed said they
bought drugs in Mexico, citing as their reasons lower prices and
their ability to make purchases without a prescription. 219
Similar to the ease of buying pharmaceutical products online,
apparently unchanged since the GAO study of 2004, the appeal of
traveling from the United States to Mexico for prescription drugs
also persists, as a tour through travel websites will confirm. 220
Mexican law treats a few drugs as stringently controlled
substances and will not permit their sale to visitors without a
Mexican prescription, 221 but American tourists report easily
buying over the counter a range of drugs that are
prescription-only in the United States and paying only a fraction
of the northern price. 222
217. See id. (stating that “physician supervision is of particular importance
[for particular drugs] due to the possibility of severe side effects . . . .”).
218. Paul R. Casner & Luis G. Guerra, Purchasing Prescription Medication
in Mexico Without a Prescription: The Experience at the Border, 165 W.J. MED.
458, 512 (1992).
219. See id. at 513 (“81% stated that they had purchased medications in
Mexico at one time or another, and 79% stated they were still [at that time]
purchasing medications in Mexico.”).
220. See Judy Hedding, Buying Prescription Drugs in Mexico, TRIPSAVVY,
https://perma.cc/9XRY-E98C (last updated Dec. 31, 2018) (last visited Oct. 14,
2019) (providing tips for travelers going to Mexico to buy prescriptions) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. See id. (warning that although consumers may purchase most drugs in
Mexico, it is illegal to carry them over the U.S. border without a prescription).
222. See id. (noting that most American tourist-purchasers are from states
with convenient access to the Mexican border, primarily “Arizonians,

44

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020)
B. “We Don’t Need Liability, Because Medically Informed
Expertise Controls the Selection of Prescribed Therapies.”

Very strong immunity rests on faith in expert knowledge. 223
Applied to the products liability category of failure to warn, this
faith supports the learned intermediary rule, a doctrine that
directs drug sellers to relay their warnings to physicians rather
than patients—and that also withholds redress from patients who
were not themselves warned—on the ground that physicians are
abler than patients to understand the risks and the benefits of a
particular drug therapy. 224 Although the Third Restatement
expresses cautious support for warning patients directly about
some drug risks, 225 judge-written exceptions to the learned
intermediary rule that entitle consumers to receive warnings
about the drugs they ingest remain rare. 226
Deference to learned intermediaries also curbs design-defect
liability. 227 Just as expert knowledge enables physicians to
construe a warning intelligently and tailor the message in it to
meet the needs of their patients, so too does that authority guide
them to eschew unsound design in a drug and decline to prescribe
it. 228 Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement writes esteem for
expert knowledge into its blackletter. 229 Its test for design defect
Californians, New Mexicans, and Texans”).
223. See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 (addressing the role of expert
physicians to cure demand-side and supply-side ignorance).
224. OWEN, supra note 20, at 608.
225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1998) (providing that a manufacturer must warn the patient directly
when it has reason to know that health care providers will not be able to reduce
the risks about which warnings would give information).
226. See OWEN, supra note 20, at 610–14 (examining three exceptions—mass
immunization programs, birth control pills, and direct-to-consumer
advertising—where courts have written in an exception for the learned
intermediary doctrine).
227. See Richard C. Ausness, When Warnings Alone Won’t Do: A Reply to
Professor Phillips, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 627, 647 (1999) (“I would conclude that the
FDA’s strict licensing process and the availability of trained personnel to serve
as learned intermediaries provide adequate protection for consumers.”).
228. See id. at 651 (noting that almost all jurisdictions recognize the learned
intermediary doctrine as an efficient way to pass information to patients).
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998) (discussing the foreseeability of harm).
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posits “reasonable health-care providers” who know the
“foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits” of the pharmaceutical
products they prescribe. 230 Although very few—arguably
zero—courts have accepted the pro-defendant Section 6(c) test for
design defect, 231 for this kind of defect the bottom line of almost
no liability is consistent with a deference hypothesis.
Learned intermediaries, who populate defective-warning law
officially and defective-design law, by tacit consensus that
non-learned persons lack authority to opine on a molecular
configuration, are understood to look out for the purchaser’s
interests through efforts that include, but are not limited to, their
veto. 232 Their presumed refusal to supply prescription drugs that
will do more harm than good is only the beginning of their work.
According to this pillar-premise applied to failure to warn,
learned intermediaries follow up on their initial prescription
decisions by monitoring the health of the consuming patient and
maintain big-picture awareness of how each prescribed drug
interacts with other medications that the patient takes. 233
To the extent that ignorance, rather than “learned” anything,
guides decisions about buying and consuming a prescription drug,
this rationale for the current pro-defendant state of doctrine
becomes weaker. The word ignorance here refers to low levels of
knowledge pertinent to the question of whether to choose or reject
a therapeutic agent. Ignorance about prescription drugs is most
obviously present within the lay patient as decider—I’ll call this
230. Id.
231. See cases cited supra notes 136–157 and accompanying text.
232. See Richard B. Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 421, 434 (2008) (“The physician
helps the patient understand which possible risks are most pertinent to the
patient’s specific situation.”); see also Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive
Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug
Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 109 (2002) (claiming that a
medically trained prescriber is more capable than a patient to choose the right
prescription drugs).
233. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The
choice [a prescribing physician] makes is an informed one, an individualized
medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.”); see
also Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 242–43 (2004) (noting
that for the rule to work, a patient must “have an ongoing opportunity to engage
the physician in a dialogue about the efficacy of the treatment prescribed”).
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the condition of “demand-side ignorance”—but physicians also
manifest it.
1. Demand-side Ignorance
Laypeople have no way to know much about the benefits and
risks of prescription drugs they consume, and the rise of
direct-to-consumer advertising has increased the consequences of
their naïveté. 234 To say that when American drug sellers bypass
physician intermediaries and promote their wares directly to the
public they exploit and foment ignorance calls for some caution.
The statement is correct enough, but a point of history deserves
mention.
When it was newly formed, the American Medical
Association, which tasks itself with speaking for physicians in the
United States, 235 embraced scorn for all therapies “advertised
directly to the laity” long before it ever insisted on clinical
evidence for safety and effectiveness as necessary for a
pharmaceutical product to deserve respectable dispensation. 236
Nineteenth-century therapeutic drugs fell into two groups. The
“ethical” kind got listed somberly in a book called the United
States Pharmacopoeia. 237 Patent medicines, whose undisclosed
ingredients were mostly water, occupied the other category. 238

234. See Julie Donohue, A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles
of Consumers and Consumer Protection, 84 MILBANK Q. 659, 677 (2006) (“A
letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine said that DTC
[advertising] ‘may tend to undermine physician control over prescribing’ and
that ‘most lay people are ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy or toxicity of
drugs.’”).
235. See Hayley Rosenman, Note, Patients’ Rights to Access Their Medical
Records: An Argument for Uniform Recognition of a Right of Access in the United
States and Australia, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1500, 1508 n.59 (1998) (citing the
AMA’s Membership Facts).
236. Donohue, supra note 234, at 665.
237. See id. at 664 (explaining that “ethical pharmaceuticals” were not
advertised to consumers in part because of the efforts of organized medicine).
238. See id. (“Patent medicine . . . advertisements routinely made
exaggerated claims about the effectiveness of their products and seldom
disclosed their ingredients or risks.”).

(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS

47

We moderns would probably not wish to swallow Lydia
Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound or “Kick-a-poo Indian Sagwa” 239
for what ails us, but the other nineteenth-century category was
not much better: Today only a few drugs listed in the first edition
of the buttoned-down Pharmacopoeia, published in 1820, are
regarded as safe and effective. 240 Neither the 1900 decision of the
Journal of the American Medical Association that urged
physician readers not to prescribe any therapeutic agent sold by
its maker directly to the lay public, nor its decree of the same
approximate date that medical journals must reject
advertisements for that type of product, originated in clinical
rigor. This caveat noted, a 1997 shift certainly enlarged ignorance
in the selection of prescription therapies by easing a particular
type of direct-to-consumer advertising. 241
American drug law never barred drug manufacturers from
speaking directly to patients about their products, but throughout
almost all the twentieth century pharmaceutical manufacturers
confined their marketing efforts to physicians. 242 After the rise of
a consumer movement in the 1970s that encouraged patients to
think of themselves as buyers entitled to information, drug
manufacturers shifted their efforts to speak to this customer
base. 243 The FDA’s 1997 announcement of conditions that in its
view made broadcast direct-to-consumer advertising acceptable
encouraged these businesses to move their spending into
television commercials. 244 The 1997 directive, in place for the

239. See id. (giving examples of patent medicines sold under trademarked
names).
240. See id. (listing “digitalis, morphine, quinine, diphtheria antitoxin,
aspirin, and ether”).
241. See id. at 685–86 (detailing the FDA’s 1997 Draft Guidance, which
permitted broadcast advertisements of prescription drugs).
242. See id. (identifying a shift in the early 1900s wherein the AMA’s focus
centered on deference to professional medical judgment).
243. See Livia Gershon, Should Drug Makers Advertise?, JSTOR DAILY (Mar.
8, 2018), https://perma.cc/K4XG-FQ6K (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“[I]n the ‘70s,
new consumer rights groups like Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen began agitating
for more patient-directed information, resulting in the requirement of patient
package inserts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
244. Wayne L. Pines, DTC TV Ad Policy Faces Challenges, FDA ADVERT. &
PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSL., June 2017, at 20.
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most part today, rested on a belief that compliance would curb
deception and manipulation in these communications. 245
When a team at Yale University undertook to review all
English-language direct-to-consumer advertisements aired in the
United States from January 2015 to 2016 to investigate how well
they hew to FDA criteria, 246 the researchers disapproved of what
they found: “Few broadcast DTC ads were fully compliant with
FDA guidelines. The overall quality of information provided in
ads was low, and suggestions of off-label promotion” 247—a move
that flat-out violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as
it is understood by the FDA and in the courts 248—“were common
for diabetes medications.” 249 The 2017 expenditure of $6.1 billion
on direct-to-consumer advertising bought a great deal of
(mis)communication. 250 Back in the late 1990s, when both the
FDA advertising directive and Restatement were new, drug
245. See
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY:
CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS
2
(1999),
https://perma.cc/EV2N-V4GU (PDF) (“The approach presumes that such
advertisements . . . . [p]resent a fair balance between information about
effectiveness and information about risk . . . . [and] [c]ommunicate all
information relevant to the product’s indication (including limitations to use) in
consumer-friendly language.”).
246. Kristina Klara et al., Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements for
Pharmaceuticals: Off-label Promotion and Adherence to FDA Guidelines, 33 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 651 (2018).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21
(1st Cir. 2013) (prohibiting fraudulent or misleading marketing of off-label uses
for FDA-approved drugs); United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbot [sic] Labs.,
995 F. Supp. 2d 357 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (same). On the FDA’s understanding of the
statute, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL PRODUCT COMMUNICATIONS
THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FDA-REQUIRED LABELING—QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2018) https://perma.cc/WHL4-XGUH (PDF)
[hereinafter MEDICAL PRODUCT COMMUNICATIONS].
249. Klara, supra note 246, at 655.
250. See Laura Entis, DTC Pharma Ad Spending Slipped 4.6% in 2017:
Kantar, MM&M (Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/FS3L-DYQZ (last visited Oct.
27, 2019) (reporting that magazine and digital advertisement spending suffered
big hits and fell 22.7% and 34.4% respectively) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); but see Beth Snyder Bulik, AbbVie, Pfizer Drive 2017 Pharma
Ad Spending Above 2016’s Tally, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:39 AM),
https://perma.cc/5Z9F-AXCQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (reporting that pharma
spending on national television advertisements in 2017 climbed by more than
$330 million from the previous year) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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manufacturers had spent much less on this advertising. 251
Whatever quantity of consumer confusion and ignorance these
ads sow is correlatively much greater now.
Readers who have seen commercials for drugs on television
might feel inclined to shrug because the products advertised in
this medium are so banal. Prescription drugs for heartburn, hay
fever, and high cholesterol may or may not be well formulated but
they seem unlikely to end up accused in court of defectiveness, if
only because it is hard to imagine them doing enough mischief to
draw contingent-fee litigation.
But this industry, which takes a MeToo approach to
intellectual-property innovation, 252 favors familiarity and
repetition also in its efforts to increase sales. 253 Drug
manufacturers habitually return to old products and old
approaches to marketing rather than try something new, and
their recourse to direct-to-consumer television advertising has
followed the same pattern: allergies on TV yesterday, more of the
same plus cancer and Alzheimer’s disease added today. 254 A
newer arrival in the roster of television-commercial conditions,
constipation that results from heavy use of opioids, seems to hark
back to the old era because constipation is only discomfort, not a
fatal illness. 255 Not all versions of this gastric condition have the
same import for products liability law, however. Targeting new
251. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS 1 (2009) https://perma.cc/6KQT-K5ZF (PDF) (“Until the late 1990s,
pharmaceutical manufacturers confined their marketing efforts largely to
physicians and other health care providers.”).
252. See infra Part IV.D.1.
253. See Kalman Applbaum, Pharmaceutical Marketing and the Invention of
the
Medical
Consumer,
3
PLOS
MED.
445,
446
(2006),
https://perma.cc/LF43-44BP (PDF) (“Promoting consumer familiarity with drugs
is one example of the very broad influence of the pharmaceutical industry.”).
254. See Bruce Horovitz & Julie Appleby, Prescription Drug Costs Are Up;
So Are TV Ads Promoting Them, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://perma.cc/X6PK-XAGJ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“For years, the DTC
industry was mostly focused on drugs that relieved long-term, typically
non-fatal afflictions like heartburn (Nexium), allergies (Claritin) and high
cholesterol (Lipitor).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See id. (“More recently . . . advertising has focused on cancer and
illnesses affecting seniors, such as Alzheimer’s disease. Ads for drugs that target
constipation caused by other drugs—opioids—hit the scene last year, reflecting
the large numbers of people taking painkillers.”).
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drug advertisements to a population whose judgment is relatively
likely to be impaired by dependency or addiction will, ceteris
paribus, increase risks in the aggregate. Unwise choices refute
the understanding—stated expressly in the Third Restatement
and held tacitly elsewhere—that “reasonable health-care
providers” who know about “foreseeable risks and therapeutic
benefits” steer the rudder of the drug-decision ship. 256
As for the effects of demand-side ignorance in particular,
direct-to-consumer advertising received early praise as an
alleviator of this problem in the commercial-speech decision
known informally as Virginia Pharmacy, 257 which, in 1976,
invalidated on First Amendment grounds a state prohibition on
pharmacists’ advertising the price of prescription drugs. 258
Virginia’s prohibition of advertising meant that consumers had
been “kept in ignorance,” wrote Justice Blackmun for the
Court. 259 Today, direct-to-consumer advertising does indeed relay
some useful information to laypeople who benefit from what they
learn. 260
But it also misinforms. According to one review, this genre of
advertising implicitly and unhelpfully denies that behavior
modification could work better than a drug to alleviate the
patient’s medical condition. 261 Half the consumers who responded
to a survey reported their inaccurate belief that drug ads must be
approved by the government before they may air. 262 FDA
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
257. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
258. See id. at 776–77 (holding that the ban could not be justified on the
basis of Virginia’s interest in “maintaining a high degree of professionalism on
the part of licensed pharmacists”).
259. Id. at 769.
260. See C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising:
Therapeutic or Toxic?, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 669, 673 (citing evidence
that exposure to advertising enlarges the dialogue between patients and
physicians, and causes “small, but statistically significant” increases in patient
compliance).
261. See id. at 674 (“By promoting a drug as the solution to a health
problem, these advertisements may lead viewers to believe that adopting
healthy behaviors, such as a good diet and exercise, are ineffective or
unnecessary.”).
262. See id. (confirming that consumers “place unwarranted trust in DTC
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disciplinary records identify a pattern related to the focus of this
Article: In the aggregate, advertisements targeted to consumers
overstate the benefits and understate the detriments of
prescription drugs. 263
Even “ask your doctor,” the helpful-sounding tagline that has
dangled on many ads for decades, 264 turns out misinformative on
the ground. For starters, there isn’t much time to ask.
Researchers estimate that the average American consumer
spends many more hours a year hearing drug commercials than
talking to a physician. 265 Although a perception that the number
of minutes per office visit has been dropping is not accurate, 266
physicians consistently report in surveys that they lack enough
time in office visits, especially for preventive care. 267
In 1995, when the current direct-to-consumer advertising era
was young, the FDA contrasted what it intends “ask your doctor”
to mean with how patients interpret this phrase. 268 The FDA said
it wants to warn consumers that “specific vigilance” is necessary
for a safe and effective encounter with this product—in other
words, that they should ask their doctors for the guidance they
ads”).
263. See id. (stating DTC advertisements encourage drug over-utilization
and promote new drugs before safety profiles and adverse effects are fully
known).
264. See Sidney Kessler et al., The Genesis of Robitussin’s “Ask Your Doctor”
Campaign—The Prevalent Theme of Pharmaceutical Advertising for Four
Decades, 9 INNOVATIVE MARKETING 69, 69–75 (2013).
265. See David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct to Consumer Drug
Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 269–70 (2007) (“[T]he average American
now views ‘as many as 16 hours of prescription drug advertisements per year,
far exceeding the average time spent with a primary care physician.’”).
266. See Meredith K. Shaw et al., The Duration of Office Visits in the United
States, 1993 to 2010, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://perma.cc/A2VG-DC3J (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (“From 1993 through
2010, reported visit duration increased over time from 17.9 minutes to 20.3
minutes for primary care visits (P <.001) and from 19.0 minutes to 21.0 minutes
for specialized visits (P <.001).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
267. See id. (“Time constraints are one of the most cited reasons by
physicians for not providing preventive care as often as guidelines would
dictate.”).
268. See Public Hearing Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581 (Aug. 16, 1995)
(soliciting patient feedback on the direct-to-consumer promotion of prescription
drugs to better understand their views and concerns).
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need 269—but consumers hear “general reassurance” that the
advertised drug will treat their conditions safely and effectively.
“Ask your doctor” comes across to consumers as “seek this
product from the authority figure who can give it to you.” One
study asked patients what they would do if they requested a
prescription and their doctor refused. 270 Almost half of
respondents hewed to the FDA ideal by saying they would accept
this answer, but a quarter said they would try to talk the doctor
into complying and another quarter said they would seek the
prescription from another provider. 271
Online ratings of physicians, written and posted (ostensibly)
by patients, increase the impact of demand-side ignorance. 272
These scores and commentary undeniably furnish pertinent
information. Old school personal referrals on which patients
would otherwise have to rely could omit or downplay what they
want to know; testimony about experiences in a medical office can
have unique value for prospective patients who peruse online
lists of providers. 273 As judgments of physician competence,
however, these reviews give wrong answers. One recent study of
physicians in eight specialties found that although consumer
ratings are consistent across platforms, they do not align with
better-informed assessments of physician quality, including
expert-written performance measures, peer-review scores by
269. See Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting
the Burden When Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1998) (urging readers that
‘specific vigilance’ is needed to protect the consumer from risks associated with
the drug”).
270. Michael S. Wilkes et al., Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising, Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 110, 119
(2000).
271. See id. (reporting that “25 percent [of people] anticipated that they
would try to change their physician’s mind, 24 percent thought that they might
attempt to obtain the prescription from a different doctor, and 15 percent
thought that they might switch to a new doctor”).
272. See Andrew Ibbotson, Patients Trust Online Reviews As Much As Doctor
Recommendations (And Other Shocking Facts About Transparency in
Healthcare), HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/J62Y-2T44
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (“When asked if they trusted online ratings and
reviews more than personal recommendations, 83.3 percent of patients said
yes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
273. See id. (attributing patients’ trust in online reviews to “healthcare’s
unique opacity”).
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fellow physicians, and assessments by medical administrators. 274
Another study, published in 2012, reported a more alarming
finding: High patient satisfaction ratings are associated with
greater expenses and increased mortality. 275
If the providers who get graded were indifferent to their
popularity scores, or if patients reliably refrained from lashing
out at physicians who disappoint them by not giving them the
drug they want in response to Ask Your Doctor, then patterns
like these could be separated from the problem of demand-side
ignorance as a source of personal injury. But providers experience
these opinions as judgments that have power. In response to a
study that went out as a survey to all physician members of a
state-level medical society filled out anonymously online, 276 most
respondents reported that their compensation was linked to
patient satisfaction and a large majority said that “patient
satisfaction surveys moderately or severely affected their job
satisfaction.” 277 Of the fifty-two qualitative responses that came
in, only three were positive. 278
Recall that a significant fraction of patients feel disappointed
when their physicians decline to write the prescription they
seek. 279 This feeling of theirs does not escape would-be
prescribers, as most of the 141 emergency room physicians who
responded to a 2013 survey reported they felt pressure to write
opioid prescriptions. 280 Not all of it came from patient
274. See Timothy J. Daskivich et al., Online Physician Ratings Fail to
Predict Actual Performance on Measures of Quality, Value, and Peer Review, 25
J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 401, 401–04 (2018) (finding no meaningful
association between consumer ratings scores and specialty-specific performance
scores, primary care physician peer-review scores, and administrator scores).
275. Joshua J. Fenton et al., The Cost of Satisfaction: A National Study of
Patient Satisfaction, Health Care Utilization, Expenditures, and Mortality, 172
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 405, 406 (2012), https://perma.cc/NG9N-EKZX (PDF).
276. Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Impact of Patient Satisfaction Ratings on
Physicians and Clinical Care, 8 PATIENT PREFERENCE & ADHERENCE 437, 437
(2014).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Wilkes, supra note 270.
280. See Sharon Kelly et al., “Pressured to Prescribe”: The Impact of
Economic and Regulatory Factors on South-Eastern ED Physicians When
Managing the Drug Seeking Patient, 9 J. EMERGENCY TRAUMA SHOCK 58, 59
(2016) (“Of the ED physicians surveyed . . . 71% reported a perceived pressure to
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demand—respondents cited other factors, among them fear of
civil liability and administrative concerns about adequate pain
management 281—but this pressure took several distinct forms.
Respondents worried about patient complaints to state medical
boards, patient complaints to the hospital administration, and
reduced reimbursement based on lower patient satisfaction
scores. 282 Demand-side ignorance has a complement or partner on
the supply side that makes its effects worse, to which we now
turn.
2. Supply-side Ignorance
As was noted, the Products Liability Restatement speaks of
“reasonable health-care providers” who know the “foreseeable
risks and therapeutic benefits” of a prescription drug. 283 This
ideal sets a high standard. Busy clinicians who did not design the
substances they prescribe cannot reasonably be expected to
immerse themselves in the particulars of everything named in
the current Physicians’ Desk Reference. What would a reasonable
health care provider, licensed to write prescriptions under
real-world conditions, achieve with respect to the selection and
monitoring of a pharmaceutical course of action? Here are three
plausible inclusions.
This provider ought to know that which a reasonable
provider knows about clinical medicine. Faced with a complaint
or presentation in the examining room, our exemplar can identify
the condition that calls for treatment and whether prescription
drugs in a general sense (in contrast to the characteristics of any
prescribe opioid analgesics to avoid administrative and regulatory
criticism . . . .”).
281. See id. at 61 (discussing several factors, including (1) physicians’
concerns that reporting “doctor shopping” patients to law enforcement could
result in HIPAA violations, but failing to report could trigger civil liability, (2)
“administrative expectations . . . that ED physicians will insure adequate pain
management,” and (3) other “[r]egulatory concerns for over- and
under- prescribing opioids”).
282. See id. (reporting that 46% of physicians expressed concerns that their
failure to treat a patient’s pain could result in a potential board of medicine
complaint).
283. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
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particular product) exist to alleviate or improve it. She is
competent to practice medicine, in short. One medical-journal
paper about competence in cardiology speaks about clinical
medicine generally when it calls for “proper application of science
to individualized treatment decisions, based upon the compilation
of historical clues, physical examination abnormalities, and
laboratory results.” 284 Whether contemporary physicians perform
well or poorly on this front is unknown, 285 because this
profession, like most, does not insist on competence as a condition
of retaining a license to practice. 286
Second, the competent provider needs knowledge of
pharmacology to inform prescription choices. 287 Questions she
ought to be able to answer: How do pharmaceutical products
address medical pathologies? What are the risks of interactions
between multiple drugs that the patient is taking? When the
patient reports or manifests a side effect from a drug, is this
condition trivial or worrisome, and how should the provider
respond?
The record of American physicians and medical education in
pharmacology is better known than their record of clinical skill.
Better known, not better. The American College of Clinical
Pharmacology published a position paper in 2015 decrying a
current “dangerous lack of pharmacology education.” 288 As the
284. Mary Ellen Beliveau et al., Physician Competence: A Perspective from
the Practicing Cardiologist, 10 METHODIST DEBAKEY CARDIOVASCULAR J. 50, 51
(2014).
285. So said an influential thinker in the field of health care quality
assessment in a 1976 lecture, published decades later around the time of his
death. See Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating Physician Competence, 78 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 857, 859 (2000) (“Testing for competence is a broad and
complex subject in which I have no competence.”).
286. See Alma Saravia, Determining Whether a Physician Is Competent to
(Sept.
8,
2017),
Practice
Medicine
Is
Complex,
HCPLIVE
https://perma.cc/DN3J-D2WU (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (“Physicians are
granted a license to practice medicine and it is presumed they will remain
‘competent’ to treat patients throughout their careers.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
287. See Peter H. Wiernik, A Dangerous Lack of Pharmacology Education in
Medical and Nursing Schools: A Policy Statement from the American College of
Clinical Pharmacology, 55 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 953, 953 (2015)
(“Consequently, correct prescribing of medicines today requires a complete
knowledge of the pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics . . . .”).
288. See id. at 953–54 (emphasizing the value of education in clinical
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quantity of pharmaceuticals on the market has increased in
recent years, medical schools and nursing schools in the United
States—institutions
where
persons
allowed
to
write
prescriptions, physicians and nurse practitioners, are
trained—have been reducing rather than increasing their
coverage of pharmacology. 289 European medical education
manifests the same inadequacy, suggesting that transnational
exchanges and collaborations cannot improve the problem in the
near term. 290
Supply-side ignorance continues in a third domain pertinent
to informed prescribing: knowledge of what to infer from factual
data. For decades, scholars have lamented the skimpy command
of foundations like statistical significance and Bayesian decision
analysis that physicians and medical students possess, not only
in the United States but around the world. 291 Studies of the
problem have focused on bad consequences that follow from
physician confusion about what the results of laboratory tests
mean 292 and implications that extend to (mis)prescribing
drugs. 293
pharmacology for health care professionals).
289. Id. at 953.
290. See D.J. Brinkman et al., Pharmacology and Therapeutics Education in
the European Union Needs Harmonization and Modernization: A Cross-sectional
Survey Among 185 Medical Schools in 27 Countries, 102 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 815, 815–16 (2017) (explaining concerns
regarding EU medical graduates who “are not adequately prepared for their
prescribing duties”).
291. See, e.g., Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical
Laboratory Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 999–1,000 (1978) (exposing the
inability of Harvard Medical School physicians to know the odds of a false
positive result); David R. Matthews & Klim McPherson, Doctors’ Ignorance of
Statistics, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 856, 856 (1987) (reporting woeful findings about
doctors’ knowledge of “elementary statistical expressions” like standard
deviation); Susan Miles et al., Statistics Teaching in Medical School: Opinions of
Practising Doctors, 10 BMC MED. EDUC. 75, 75 (2010) (summarizing a British
survey of physicians that agreed on the need for better education in light of
“advances in information technology and the increasing importance of
evidence-based medicine”).
292. See Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates in Medical Care, 59 ARK. L.
REV. 527, 528–36 (2006) (examining how patients’ treatments suffer as a result
of common physician mistakes in probabilistic reasoning).
293. See, e.g., Judith G. Edersheim & Theodore A. Stern, Liability
Associated with Prescribing Medications, 11 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 115, 115–19 (presenting a case scenario where a primary
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Doctors learn about pharmaceutical products from sales
representatives, sometimes called “detailers,” who visit their
offices with samples, literature, and occasional gifts. 294 A 2007
medical journal paper reported that about 90,000 people worked
in the United States as detailers whose employers spent an
average of $15,000 per physician on this marketing. 295
Representatives not only sell their employers’ products but also
purport “to provide busy physicians up-to-date information about
the pros and cons of using the promoted drugs and to keep them
abreast with the cutting-edge advances in the field in general,”
writes a public health scholar, adding that “[t]he borderline
between genuine recommendation and profit-oriented persuasion
is thin.” 296
In its regulation of what detailers may tell physicians about
the pharmaceutical items they promote, the FDA requires that
these communications be consistent with what it has approved
for the product. 297 People who listen to detailing need the ability
to hear what the sales representative is saying (and not saying)
about the drug and to recognize artful claims about safety,
effectiveness, or the suitability of the substance for classes of
patients. Ignorance on their part makes this dialogue a source of
danger.
care physician might be liable for the injuries of his patient and the downstream
harm to an innocent bystander injured in a motor vehicle accident a week after
he prescribed his 80-year-old patient with heart disease and hypertension an
“atypical antipsychotic medication” for his anxiety and insomnia).
294. See Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script:
How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 625
(2007) (“Physicians view drug information provided by reps as a convenient, if
not entirely reliable, educational service.”); see also Lars Noah, Doctors on the
Take: Aligning Tort Law to Address Drug Company Payments to Prescribers, 66
BUFF. L. REV. 855, 872–73 (2018) (exploring the influence of gifts on prescribers’
treatment decisions).
295. Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring
the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184, 184 (2007).
296. Avinash
R.
Patwardhan,
Physicians-Pharmaceutical
Sales
Representatives Interactions and Conflict of Interest: Challenges and Solutions,
53 INQUIRY 1, 1 (2016).
297. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2008) (“Advertisements broadcast through
media such as radio, television, or telephone communications systems shall
include information relating to the major side effects and contraindications of
the advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of the
presentation . . . .”).
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3. Enlarging Ignorance: Overpromotion

The word overpromotion will sound relatively harmless to
the American ear, which hears the prefix “over” as connoting too
much of a good thing. Do it, but don’t overdo it. “Overdeception,”
“overmistreatment,” and “overjeopardy” are not English nouns. If
words like these existed, they would describe drug-manufacturer
conduct more accurately than the anodyne “overpromotion.”
Twenty-first century American overpromotion settlements
are narratives replete with deception, mistreatment, and
imperiling of patient welfare. Because overpromotion functions to
tell physicians at best baselessly—and sometimes with clear
intent to deceive—that a pharmaceutical product is safe and
effective enough to treat a medical condition, as a behavior by
drug manufacturers it increases supply-side ignorance by
spreading and entrenching false information.
Below I group together illustrative patterns of industry
misconduct that came to light under the overpromotion rubric. In
all of them, pharmaceutical manufacturers chose to settle civil
and criminal actions under the False Claims Act and thereby
conceded the truth of accusations—at least implicitly, but also on
some occasions in the form of explicit admissions. These actions
fall outside products liability, a domain in which there are
(almost) no bad drugs, but they lost manufacturers money.
Although prescription-drug overpromotion also took place well
before the turn of the current century, 298 the settlement accounts
I have gathered are all younger than age fifteen, suggesting that
the problem continues.
Promotion for uses that a manufacturer knew would not
work, or was told by the FDA that it could not lawfully
recommend. After the FDA approved a drug called Actimmune to

298. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973)
(faulting a manufacturer for “‘watering down’ its warnings and so
over-promoting”); Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E. 2d 1203, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages for a claim of defective warning
that included overpromotion). For a review of drug overpromotion—now more
than twenty years old, but informative—see Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing
the Net in Shallow Waters: Product Liability Concerns and Advertising on the
Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 220–21 (1998) (addressing overpromotion as
dilutive of FDA-approved warnings).
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treat two rare conditions, 299 its manufacturer launched research
trials to learn whether Actimmune could also treat the more
common disease of pulmonary fibrosis. These trials ended after
evidence came in that Actimmune did not work for this
purpose. 300 Its manufacturer, InterMune, promoted this drug for
pulmonary fibrosis anyway, and paid a $36.9 million settlement
to resolve criminal and civil charges. 301 In a much costlier
example of this phenomenon, the manufacturer Amgen promoted
its drug Aranesp at higher doses that the FDA had expressly
rejected. 302 Amgen’s settlement of overpromotion claims that
covered Aranesp and two of its other products cost the company
$612 million. 303
Promotion for pediatric uses that were never approved by the
FDA, thereby putting young children at risk. Forest Laboratories
promoted the antidepressant Celexa—approved by the FDA only
for adult depression—as a treatment for children and
adolescents. 304 A $313 million settlement covered this
overpromotion along with unlawful marketing of two other
drugs. 305 The FDA had approved Loprox for fungicide treatment
299. See Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker Stops Work on Lung Disease
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2007), https://perma.cc/6P6S-EFZY (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019) (“Actimmune, also known as interferon gamma, is approved to
treat two extremely rare diseases—chronic granulomatous disease and severe
malignant osteopetrosis.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
300. See id. (reporting that the company halted the 826-patient trial after an
interim analysis showed that 14.5% of the patients receiving Actimmune had
died, compared to only 12.7% of those getting the placebo drug).
301. The federal government charged InterMune with promoting an off-label
use in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.
302. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Amgen
Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, NY; Pays $762 Million to
Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://perma.cc/B2DJ-YWD5 (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (noting that Amgen also
tried to market Aranesp for an off-label treatment that the FDA had never
approved) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
303. Amgen also submitted false claims to government insurance programs
for off-label uses of Enbrel and Neulasta. Id.
304. See Natasha Singer, Forest, Maker of Celexa, to Pay More Than $313
Million to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010),
https://perma.cc/M2M5-CDFW (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (reporting that Forest
illegally marketed the drug for off-label uses, including headaches and cerebral
palsy in children and failed to disclose negative results of a study on Celexa in
adolescents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
305. See id. (“In addition, federal prosecutors accused Forest of paying

60

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020)

of children over age ten; Medicis Pharmaceutical promoted this
drug for diaper rash, and paid $9.8 million to settle a
whistleblower-brought federal action that brought this
overpromotion to light. 306
Selling epilepsy medication to treat more than epilepsy. About
three and a half million people in the United States are currently
treated for epilepsy, 307 and this level of therapeutic attention is
apparently lower than the pharmaceutical sector wants. We may
infer as much from how hard manufacturers have worked to
convince physicians to prescribe drugs to treat other conditions
after the FDA had approved these drugs only for the treatment of
epilepsy. 308 And here when I say “how hard manufacturers have
worked,” by “how hard” I mean “how unlawfully.” Penalties for
this misconduct have been steep. The most notorious
overpromotion in the epilepsy category involved Neurontin, which
Parke-Davis marketed to treat bipolar disorder, migraines, and
non-epilepsy seizures, among other disorders. 309 This
manufacturer paid more than $430 million to settle civil and
criminal charges. 310

doctors to induce them to prescribe Celexa and another antidepressant,
Lexapro.”).
306. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Medicis
Pharmaceutical to Pay U.S. $9.8 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations
(May 8, 2007), https://perma.cc/T8G3-4SHB (last visited Oct. 5, 2019)
(“Loprox . . . is not a ‘medically accepted indication’ for the treatment of diaper
dermatitis and other skin disorders in children under 10.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. More Americans Have Epilepsy than Ever Before, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL (Aug. 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/J628-YMB7 (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
308. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care
Liability
Relating
to
Off-label
Promotion
(May
13,
2004),
https://perma.cc/R8KJLFUJ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (“The drug Neurontin was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in December 1993 solely for
adjunctive or supplemental anti-seizure use by epilepsy patients.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. See id. (confirming that Neurontin was marketed to treat eight
different disorders that had not been approved by the FDA, including the
degenerative nerve disease ALS, restless leg syndrome, and attention deficit
disorder).
310. Id.
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When the Department of Justice (DoJ) announced what it
called the “largest health care fraud settlement in history,” 311
overpromotion of an epilepsy drug was included in the fraudulent
conduct so sanctioned. 312 Pfizer, Inc. marketed Lyrica, which the
announcement described as “an anti-epileptic drug,” to treat
other conditions. 313 This epilepsy penalty was attached to a
separate “criminal fine of $1.195 billion, the largest criminal fine
ever imposed in the United States for any matter,” 314 said DoJ,
for misconduct amenable to being classified with the first
grouping of this list, FDA-vetoed assertions: “Pfizer promoted the
sale of Bextra for several uses and dosages that the FDA
specifically declined to approve due to safety concerns.” 315
Another manufacturer peddled its epilepsy-only approved product
as a treatment of “anxiety, insomnia and pain.” 316 Other epilepsy
drugs have joined the roster of overpromotion settlements. 317
311. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History
(Sept. 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/JG8N-KXJ4 (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last
visited Oct. 9, 2019) (reporting that Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the
fraudulent marketing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This
dollar record went on to be broken. See infra note 318 (discussing the $1.415
billion Zyprexa settlement).
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to Pay $425 Million & Enter Plea to
Resolve
Allegations
of
Off-label
Marketing
(Sept.
29,
2008),
https://perma.cc/5CXR-KJB5 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (summarizing settlement
of charges for Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations related to drug Gabitril)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
317. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two
Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay over $81 Million to Resolve Allegations
of Off-label Promotion of Topamax (Apr. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/3E6V-AK9U
(last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Topamax
overpromotion settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. to Pay More than $420 Million to Resolve Off-label
Promotion
and
Kickback
Allegations
(Sept.
30,
2010),
https://perma.cc/36B3LQYU (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9,
2019) (involving the Trileptal overpromotion settlement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Companies to Pay $214.5 Million to Resolve
Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zonegran (Dec. 15, 2010),
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Selling psychiatric drugs to treat more than the psychiatric
conditions for which manufacturers had FDA approval. As a
penalty reminiscent of the billion-plus that Pfizer had to suffer
for its overpromotion of Bextra, Eli Lilly paid $1.415 billion for its
off-label promotion of Zyprexa, a drug that the FDA had approved
first for bipolar disorder and later schizophrenia. 318 Apparently
unsatisfied with this limited marketing opportunity, Lilly decided
unilaterally—and unlawfully—to pitch Zyprexa to nursing homes
and assisted-living facilities as a treatment of “dementia,
Alzheimer’s dementia, depression, anxiety, and sleep problems,
and behavioral symptoms such as agitation, aggression, and
hostility.” 319 This sum was topped by a $3 billion array of
penalties imposed on GlaxoSmithKline for misconduct pertaining
mostly, but not entirely, to the psychotropic drugs Paxil and
Wellbutrin. 320

https://perma.cc/N2GU-YRT3 (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9,
2019) (involving the Zonegran overpromotion settlement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Subsidiary of Belgian Pharmaceutical Manufacturer
Pleads Guilty to Off-label Promotion; Company to Pay More than $34 Million
(June 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/5MBP-XS86 (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last
visited Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Keppra overpromotion settlement) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub.
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve
Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote (May 7,
2012), https://perma.cc/WTE9-GJBL (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last visited
Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Depakote overpromotion settlement) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve
Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012),
https://perma.cc/T2N5-BJ5P (last updated May 22, 2015) (last visited Oct. 9,
2019) [hereainafter GlaxoSmithKline] (involving the Lamictal overpromotion
settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
318. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and
Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label
Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/ZV62-WJCP (last
updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
319. Id.
320. See GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 317 (characterizing the multi-billion
dollar settlement as “unprecedented in both size and scope” and underscoring
the Attorney General’s “firm commitment to protecting the American people and
holding accountable those who commit health care fraud”).
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Our quick tour through overpromotion has looked at just a
fraction of the twenty-first century total. A page titled “List of
off-label promotion pharmaceutical settlements” on Wikipedia
starts with the $430 million Neurontin settlement in 2004 and
(as of late 2019) continues with another 38 actions, all brought
under the False Claims Act. 321 No other industry has its own
wiki-list of False Claims Act episodes, and the roster includes the
biggest and most famous drug manufacturers. 322 One Big Pharma
name conspicuous by its absence from this overpromotion
settlements compendium, the Swiss giant Roche, is very much
present in false-statement personal injury case law under a
predecessor corporate identity: In 2000 the Nebraska Supreme
Court ruled that its marketing of Accutane, which “misled the
medical community with incomplete and inaccurate information
regarding the safety of the drug,” supported a cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation. 323
Drug companies commonly overpromote their products, in
short. The “over-” prefix of the word implies deviation, but
overpromotion is so frequent as to be close to the norm.
Regulators declare “You may say only X about your product,” and
the sector—well aware that crossing this line violates the law
and has generated significant-looking penalties for dozens of
pharmaceutical companies—routinely says X and Y and Z.
As an industry practice, overpromotion shows part of what is
wrong with the leading blackletter test for drug design defect.
321. List of Off-label Promotion Pharmaceutical Settlements, WIKIPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/9ULR-ZMKR (last updated Sept. 21, 2019) (last visited Nov. 1,
2019) [hereinafter WIKIPEDIA] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
322. See Monique Ellis, Who Are the Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies in
the World? (2019), PROCLINICAL (Mar. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/U6B6-YKF3
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (listing the ten pharmaceutical companies with the
highest revenues world-wide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Top 50 Global Pharmaceutical Companies by Prescription Sales and
R&D
Spending
in
2018
(in
Billion
U.S.
Dollars),
STATISTA,
https://perma.cc/GT85-A2GG (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
323. Freeman v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 844–45 (Neb.
2000). This decision, which reports a rare success in the annals of
prescription-drug products liability, is used in a torts casebook to illustrate
pharmaceutical liability generally. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 971–82 (4th ed. 2016).
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Recall that the Third Restatement says that a prescription drug
is defectively designed only if “reasonable health-care providers,
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would
not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.” 324 This test looks out for the health of a small and
vulnerable cohort. 325 If a drug is the treatment of choice for even
a tiny number of patients—the class has no minimum size,
suggesting that one person would suffice—then its design is good
enough, says the Restatement, and the drug deserves to remain
in the marketplace of treatments. 326
But the pharmaceutical sector emphatically does not want to
live with a tiny market. Like every other maker of a product
offered in commerce, it is in the business of selling units—and not
just selling, of course, but selling more. Unlike manufacturers of
other products, many of which items are relatively cheap and
easy to bring to market, drug manufacturers have to spend
millions of dollars and wait patiently through rounds of trials
before they can pursue customers for a new commodity. 327 Any
such business will want to hustle as thoroughly as it can to gain
returns on its investment; being told by a regulator that it may
say only X about this commodity rather than X and Y and Z will
chafe. Overpromotion may not be quite baked into its marketing
plan, but bigger promises will appear attractive for any drug
whose FDA-approved recommendations do not reach enough
customers to slake the thirst of its seller.

324. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
325. See Cupp, supra note 128, at 96–97 (stating that the Third Restatement
allows design liability “only in the few cases in which the prescription product is
so lacking in utility and so steeped in risk that a reasonable medical provider
would not prescribe it to any class of patients”).
326. See id. (affirming the highly limited nature of product design liability
for prescription drugs).
327. See Ellis, supra note 322 (“Being a research-driven industry,
approximately $150 billion is spent by pharmaceutical companies every year on
research and development projects. Out of thousands of compounds, only a small
percentage gain regulatory approval to be used by patients to treat
disease . . . .”).
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C. A Rhetorical Question: Who Is a Judge or Juror or Litigator to
Disapprove of a Product After Independent Expert Authority Has
Said It Is Both Safe and Effective?
Here we return to a topic addressed earlier under the rubric
of preemption and can be brief. Whereas most products travel
directly from design and manufacture to placement in the stream
of commerce without premarketing review by the government,
experts at the Food and Drug Administration examine the design
of this product and must approve it before it can reach
customers. 328 Congress has charged the FDA with an obligation
to satisfy itself that a new product of this category is both safe
and effective before customers may buy it, 329 and FDA regulation
of this product continues after its launch on the market.
Litigants who complain about a prescription drug thus
challenge an informed judgment that its design and
accompanying verbiage were good enough to pass analysis that
resembles the risk-utility test for the design defect. By deeming
the drug safe enough to be lawfully sold, the FDA made a
favorable judgment about its risk level and deeming it effective
implies a favorable judgment about its utility. 330 Defenders of
near-immunity can contend plausibly that persons in the United
States who consume prescription drugs have already enjoyed
significant protection from the risk of defectiveness.
Nevertheless, condoning of a drug by the FDA does not suffice to
show that no defect is present.
The Reporters who drafted a nearly immunizing rule
conceded in a comment to their rule that “unqualified deference”
to this agency would be unwise, 331 and in their scholarly writing
328. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018).
329. See id. § 355(d) (requiring that test results confirm the drug is “safe for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
labeling thereof” before FDA approval can be granted).
330. See James A. Henderson Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 471, 481 (1998) (“[S]ubstantial deference to a marketplace for
prescription drugs that appears to function almost perfectly [due to FDA
regulation] is warranted.”).
331. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (acknowledging that a “growing number of courts” consider
this deference unjustified).
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they have hewed to this position. 332 Indeed, they came to put it in
sharper terms. Whereas in the Restatement they wrote simply
that “the FDA occasionally makes mistakes,” 333 by 2015 they
worried that “the FDA relies almost exclusively on data
developed by private drug manufacturers.” 334 Agency decisions to
approve new drug applications “are thus vulnerable, to an extent
that judicial decisions are not, to being influenced by
understatements and misstatements of the relevant risks.” 335
Congress enlarged FDA vulnerability to manufacturer
influence in late 2016 by passing the 21st Century Cures Act, 336 a
statute that relaxed standards for approval of new
pharmaceutical drugs and devices. 337 This legislation wrote
exceptions to the familiar demand that the drug manifest safety
and effectiveness through randomized clinical trials: instead, for
some applications “real world evidence”—which can include
insurance records and loosely gathered observational
studies—will suffice for FDA approval. 338 It furnished a shortcut
to approval by dropping a requirement that the FDA analyze
332. See Dan Farber, Preemption and Prescription Drugs, LEGAL PLANET
(Jan. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc/2MF9-5ZK5 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (arguing
that blindly trusting the FDA’s opinion on the safety and effectiveness of a drug
is becoming less plausible and suggesting that state tort law simply balances
the risks and benefits differently, rather than second guessing the FDA’s
scientific judgment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
333. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 162–63 (arguing that
section 6(c) of the Restatement realizes the FDA may occasionally “approv[e]
worthless drugs that no competent provider would prescribe”).
334. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 538.
335. Id.
336. 21st Century Cures Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3093(f)(1), 130
Stat. 1033.
337. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360ff-1 (2018) (stating the purpose of this section
of the Cures Act: “to facilitate the development, review, and approval of
genetically targeted drugs . . . to address unmet medical need in one or more
patient subgroups . . . .”).
338. See Trudy Lieberman, With Media Watchdogs on the Sidelines,
Pharma-Funded Advocacy Groups Pushed Cures Act to the Finish Line, HEALTH
NEWS REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/8EQX-UFH5 (last visited Oct. 12,
2019) (“[The 21st Century Cures Act] loosen[s] regulation over drug and device
makers, reduce[s] the number of clinical trials needed to approve a drug, and
permit[s] advertising for off-label drug uses, all of which would help drug and
device makers expand their markets.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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study results independently, permitting manufacturers to submit
data summaries instead. 339 Medical devices have long been held
to a more lenient standard for approval than the one for drugs; 340
the 21st Century Cures Act expanded this lenity by recognizing
“combination products” that contain both drugs and devices and
blesses them with the lower standard used for devices. 341 An
analyst quoted in the New York Times soon after this legislation
passed called it “a holiday win” for health-sector businesses and
investors. 342
Twenty-seven years ago, a separate piece of federal
legislation took effect to similar effect: The Prescription Drug
User Fee Act 343 compels the FDA to charge pharmaceutical
manufacturers for reviewing new drug applications. 344 The
consumer activist group Public Citizen, contending that this
enactment makes the FDA in effect a customer of the sector it
regulates, has followed post-1993 approved drugs and in 2011
reported that the FDA had withdrawn twenty of them. 345
Continuing reauthorization of this statute has meant that
manufacturers finance agency review of the applications they
submit. 346 As of 2020 the FDA is charging a flat fee of $2,942,965
339. See id. (“New drugs could be approved on the basis of data summaries
rather than requiring the FDA to independently analyze study results for a new
drug indication.”).
340. See generally RICHARD A. MERRILL, REGULATION OF DRUGS & DEVICES:
AN EVOLUTION (1994), https://perma.cc/2JG9-5BPR (PDF) (explaining that
Congress sought to create a more relaxed framework for medical devices in
order to facilitate innovation, but suggesting that external pressures and
internal practices may soon bring device regulation “closer to the ‘drug model’”).
341. See Lieberman, supra note 338 (“A combination product that’s part
drug and part device such as infusion pumps could be approved based on the
less stringent rules for device regulation [rather] than the tougher rules for
drugs.”).
342. Jennifer Steinhauer & Robert Pear, Sweeping Health Measure, Backed
by Obama, Passes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/J6E99WHT (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
343. 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2018).
344. See id. § 379h(a) (authorizing the FDA to assess and collect fees for
drug testing on human subjects).
345. Update on Withdrawals of Dangerous Drugs in the U.S., WORST PILLS,
BEST PILLS (Jan. 2011), https://perma.cc/AZ2P-UA6G (last visited Nov. 2, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
346. See Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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per application that needs clinical data, half that for an
application that needs no clinical data, plus a $325,424 “program
fee” for most applications. 347 Manufacturers, especially ones that
pay for numerous reviews, have reason to think that the FDA is
working for them.
Sharing henhouse-oversight power with foxes has generated
injuries that go beyond the approval of dangerous drugs.
Researchers at John Hopkins University learned in 2018 that
when the FDA decided to expand its authorization of fentanyl
treatments to benefit a larger class of patients, it turned over
management of the distribution to a private entity that worked
with manufacturers. 348 Whereas the FDA had permitted
furnishing these fentanyl products only to patients with cancer
and demonstrated high tolerance for opioids, 349 this intermediary
gave it out liberally to patients with other complaints. 350 Some of
them died. 351 The program enriched manufacturers with
prescriptions billed at more than $30,000 each for a month’s
supply. 352

(May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/XWA7-NJ8C (last updated Aug. 16, 2019) (last
visited Oct. 12, 2019) (describing the multiple reauthorizations of the PDUFA)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
347. Id.
348. See Emily Baumgaertner, F.D.A. Did Not Intervene to Curb Risky
Fentanyl Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/LT8S-FF8M
(last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (describing the FDA’s failure to enforce off-label
prescription of fentanyl) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
349. See id. (noting that the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research had information that “seems to indicate people who aren’t cancer
patients are getting [the class of fentanyl drugs] and people who aren’t opioid
tolerant are getting this”).
350. See id. (reporting that one patient was prescribed fentanyl for “chronic
back pain from two car accidents and a fibromyalgia diagnosis” while another
suffered from a degenerative spinal disease).
351. See id. (citing several instances where patients died of drug toxicity,
including one whose toxicology report revealed that “the fentanyl in [the
patient’s] blood was between 15 and 20 times the appropriate level”).
352. Id.
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D. The Belief That Tort Liability Lamentably Thwarts the Sector’s
Significant Contributions to Public Health
Unlike the last section, this concluding discussion for the
Part will not be brief; the belief examined here is the
furthest-reaching of the four and warrants the deepest dive. To
condemn a drug design or warning in court is to say that every
unit is defective now, 353 with every user positioned to seek
redress that in the aggregate can be powerful enough to drive a
product from the market. 354 A prescription drug might be
sufficiently profitable for sellers to laugh off the price of tort
liability, but not all are. 355 Tort, when costly enough, can send
valuable products into oblivion, lost to patients forever. 356
Consider collective and social impacts. Prescription drugs are
routinely chosen for other people, including children, hospital
patients, and adult consumers who do not participate actively in
their health decisions. 357 In this way they are useful to
bystanders and third-party purchasers, not only the people who
pay for them or ingest them. Beyond this decision-making circle,
some prescription drugs improve public health. 358 Medications
353. See OWEN, supra note 20, at 553–60 (explaining broad-scale
consequences of litigation over drug design or warning).
354. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (“If drug
manufacturers were subject to strict liability, they might be reluctant to
undertake research programs to develop some pharmaceuticals that would
prove beneficial or to distribute others that are available to be marketed,
because of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments.”).
355. See id. (citing “a host of examples of products which have greatly
increased in price or have been withdrawn or withheld from the market because
of the fear that their producers would be held liable for large judgments”).
356. See, e.g., id. (“Benedictin, the only antinauseant drug available for
pregnant women, was withdrawn from sale in 1983 because the cost of
insurance almost equaled the entire income from the sale of the
drug . . . . [Likewise] [d]rug manufacturers refused to supply a newly discovered
vaccine for influenza on the ground that mass inoculation would subject them to
enormous liability.”).
357. See, e.g., Baumgaertner, supra note 348 (describing one patient’s
“complete trust” in her doctors’ decision to prescribe fentanyl for her chronic
back pain and fibromyalgia).
358. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (“Public policy favors the development and
marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks, perhaps serious
ones, might accompany their introduction, because drugs can save lives and
reduce pain and suffering.”)
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and preventatives for transmittable diseases heal both
individuals and the body politic. 359 The value of a drug extends
beyond what it does for its buyers.
These truths about prescription drugs form a pillar that
ascribes benevolence to the industry. 360 Differing from other
consumer-product
manufacturers
that
make
take-‘em-or-leave-‘em
items—to
support
transportation,
manufacture,
hobbies,
aesthetics,
household
tasks,
entertainment, and so on—this sector makes commodities
necessary for health. 361 Partnered almost synonymously with
wealth, its rhyme, health is a central constituent of public
welfare. 362 “Leave the sector alone,” says this pillar to tort
liability, except in the unusual circumstance where forcing it to
pay damages is desirable. It keeps us alive and well.
How merited is this shelter from liability? Putting aside the
special case of vaccines, a unique drug category outside the scope
of this Article that probably did warrant its 1986 rescue from the
reach of tort, 363 it is impossible to know whether any prescription
drug that increases health needed the boost of exceptionally
favorable products liability doctrine to reach the public. We do,
however, have reason to conclude that many offerings from this
sector have brought relatively little to the array of
health-generating treatments on the market. 364 The industry
engages in useful activity, to be sure. But it does much more than
359. See id. (deeming penicillin and cortisone “two of the greatest medical
boons to the human race”).
360. See supra Parts III.A–III.C.
361. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 (distinguishing prescription drugs from
lawnmowers and perfumes because unlike other consumer products,
prescription drugs “may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or sustain
life”).
362. See id. at 478–79 (pointing out the “broader public interest in the
availability of drugs at an affordable price”).
363. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et seq.
(2018) (establishing a scheme under which compensation may be paid for
vaccine-related injuries or deaths).
364. See, e.g., Nicholas Florko, ‘Everyone Is at Fault:’ With Insulin Prices
Skyrocketing, There’s Plenty of Blame to Go Around, STAT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/C36M-6NHY (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (reporting that the
pharmaceutical industry has “hundreds of unexpired patents” for insulin, but
still charges extraordinarily high prices for trivially modified variations of the
century-old drug) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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make people better off. One of its notoriously bad products has
made the public worse off.
1. MeToo Drugs and Other Dubious Intellectual Property
According to this pillar supporting near-total products
liability immunity, a kindly industry needs extra tolerance so
that it can invent and sell its health-giving new ideas. The large
majority of ostensibly new drugs in the United States “are not
new at all,” observed Marcia Angell, longtime editor-in-chief of
the New England Journal of Medicine; Angell called them
“merely variations of older drugs already on the market.” 365
Innovation occurs, but the sector gains new patents and profits
without creating anything fresh. 366 “If I’m a manufacturer and I
can change one molecule and get another twenty years of patent
rights,” said Sharon Levine, an expert interviewed on a television
special, “and convince physicians to prescribe and consumers to
demand the next form of Prilosec, or weekly Prozac instead of
daily Prozac, just as my patent expires, then why would I be
spending money on a lot less certain endeavor, which is looking
for brand-new drugs?” 367
The gallery of MeToo consists mostly of trivial novel
innovations, but some add even less to public well-being. The
notorious OxyContin should never have been granted a patent,
argues a Harvard-based team of three scholars credentialed in
law, medicine, and public health. 368 We encountered OxyContin

365. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xxiv (2004).
366. See Efthimios Parasidis, Health Outcomes Metrics and the Role of
Financial Derivative Instruments in the Health Care Industry, 10 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 447, 462 (2013) (“Studies have documented the lack of innovative medical
products and [the pharmaceutical] industry’s focus on me-too drugs, which are
drugs that mimic successfully marketed products.”).
367. RASHMI AGGARWAL & RAJINDER KAUR, PATENT LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE MEDICAL FIELD 30 (2017) (quoting Sharon Levine).
368. See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken
Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 468 (2017) (attributing
Purdue’s success to “low patenting standards” illustrated by the fact that
Oxycontin’s constituent elements had been developed “decades earlier” and were
first introduced in the United States in 1939).
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earlier in this article and it will soon return. 369 Here it serves as
an example of dubious intellectual property. 370 Years before it
came up with OxyContin, its manufacturer Purdue Pharma had
developed a technology known as Contin whose function is to
control the release of a drug from a tablet. 371 Purdue applied
Contin to the un-patentable morphine to form MS Contin, and
MS Contin became its top-selling drug. 372 The idea behind
OxyContin was to apply Contin to the similar-to-morphine
oxycodone; “the combination of Contin and oxycodone would have
been obvious to any pharmaceutical chemist.” 373
The United States Patent and Trademark Office duly
rejected Purdue’s patent application as obvious, but the company
found a slight and obscure difference between extended-release
oxycodone and other extended-release opioid analgesics and won
its patent. 374 Purdue continued its aggressive deployment of
intellectual property by patenting an abuse-deterrent version of
OxyContin, ceasing to manufacture its original formulation to
force customers into the new design, and pressing the FDA
successfully to forbid generic versions of the original OxyContin,
ostensibly on safety grounds. 375 Manufacturers of generic
OxyContin eventually succeeded in challenging the secondary

369. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text; infra notes 437–450,
458– 460 and accompanying text.
370. See Sarpatwari, supra note 368, at 471–72 (explaining that
“non-rigorous patent standards” have enabled pharmaceutical companies to
obtain patents and extend market exclusivity).
371. Id. at 469.
372. See id. (“[E]xtended release morphine (MS Contin)—quickly became
[Purdue’s] highest grossing drug, generating annual sales of approximately $170
million in the early 1990s.”).
373. Id. at 470.
374. See id. (explaining that the USPTO accepted Purdue’s contention that
“a person of ordinary skill would not have sought to use a narrower dosage
range for extended-release oxycodone than for other extended-release opioid
analgesics” and that this narrower dosage range “provided pain relief for ninety
percent of patients”); see also Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438
F.3d 1123, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (providing a more detailed explanation of
Purdue’s patents for its controlled-release oxycodone formulation).
375. See Sarpatwari, supra note 368, at 471 (describing Purdue’s attempts to
extend its market exclusivity for its extended-release drug).
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patents, but Purdue won precious time to set up elaborate
promotion. 376
Lack of innovation in the sector, a condition long lamented by
investors who buy stock in pharmaceutical companies, 377 is
ironically highlighted by innovation that this community of critics
has created: Investment prospects are so bleak that the
much-derided tool of a derivative makes sense as a policy fix. 378
According to one scholarly proposal presented as reparative
rather than gimmicky, derivatives markets could offer a long
position that a drug innovation will fail and a short position that
it will capture significant market share. 379 Meanwhile, investors
remain frustrated by the sector’s apparent inability to formulate
what to them appears a simple innovation, new antibiotics in
response to antibiotic resistance, 380 and a major financial services
advisor has reported a negative feedback loop where drug
companies lower their spending on research and development
because they lack confidence that this investment will pay off, a
decision that reduces their innovation. 381
Investors’ disappointing portfolio returns may be of limited
interest to the rest of us, but all persons have a stake in the
welfare that innovative drugs deliver and that most new drugs
lack. 382 When innovation is absent in a new drug, the public not
376. See In re Contin Antitrust Litig., 994 F. Supp. 2d 367, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (finding that one secondary patent was not infringed and invalidating the
other as obvious).
377. JIE JACK LI, BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 171 (2014).
378. See Parasidis, supra note 366, at 462–63 (“HOI [health outcomes
indices]-based derivatives can spur innovation by allowing innovators to hedge
risk.”).
379. Id.
380. See Lori Ioannou, Big Pharma’s Billion Dollar Scramble to Invest in
Start-ups to Fuel Innovation, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/SSV7-PGD8 (last updated Mar. 28, 2018, 11:52 AM) (last
visited Oct. 12, 2019) (describing the need for antibiotics that can fight drug
resistant bacteria) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
381. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEASURING THE RETURN
FROM PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 8 (2015), https://perma.cc/TGS9-6HZJ (PDF)
8 (“[C]ompanies continue to struggle to deliver new assets with sufficient value
to offset losses through failure or increasing costs.”).
382. See, e.g., Inannou, supra note 380 (emphasizing the public need for a
new generation of antibiotics, reporting that “more than 700,000 people die each
year from infections resistant to most or all [current] antibiotics” with
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only fails to benefit but can also suffer. Jerry Avorn, a physician
and pharmacologist, has drafted a bit of boilerplate that deserves
to be slapped on many drug labels: “This new medication has not
been shown to be better than currently available products, and
has a much more limited safety record. There is no evidence that
its higher price is accompanied by any demonstrated therapeutic
advantage.” 383
2. Industry-generated Lowering of Thresholds for Chronic
Conditions
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have come up with an idea of
how to increase sales when they lack an idea. Chronic diseases
make money for the sector because patients live long enough to
keep buying but do not get well enough to walk away from their
prescription. Patent rents as a reward, writes the intellectual
property scholar Samuel Murumba, encourage manufacturers to
invest their research energies in this type of pathology rather
than in vaccines or cures, “both of which wipe out the disease and
thus destroy the goose guaranteed to lay the golden egg.” 384
In this setting, one way to make more new money selling
prescription drugs without innovation in design is to enlarge this
market, whose customers—all of them relatively unlikely to have
their diagnosis undone—take daily doses. 385 According to a 2012
review, sixity percent of the medications most often prescribed in
the United States are for three such chronic conditions:
hypertension or high blood pressure, hyperlipidemia or high
cholesterol, and diabetes. 386 All three are diagnosed with
reference to numerical cutoffs. 387 This much systolic and diastolic
antimicrobial resistance “projected to kill more people than cancer by 2050”).
383. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES 365 (2004).
384. SAMUEL MURUMBA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A
TRI-REGIME ACCOUNT AND THE CHALLENGE OF PERVERSE INCENTIVES 15 (2018).
385. See Linda M. Hunt et al., The Changing Face of Chronic Illness
Management in Primary Care: A Qualitative Study of Underlying Influences and
Unintended Outcomes, 10 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 452, 455 (2012) (listing
medications frequently taken by people with common chronic conditions).
386. Id. at 452.
387. See id. at 453 (showing a table of the numerical diagnostic cutoffs for
each condition).
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pressure as measured in numbered units, or this many
milligrams of cholesterol or glucose, take a patient over the
disease threshold. 388
Quantitative minimums to qualify for all three diagnoses
have been reduced in the last couple of decades. 389 Fasting
glucose of 126 now marks the transition to diabetes in contrast to
the 1992 cutoff, which had been 140. 390 The year 1992 lacked a
disease of today called “prediabetes,” a condition that these days
receives pharmaceutical treatment. 391 For patients without
diabetes, blood pressure can go as high as 160/95 without
reaching a diagnostic threshold; today the nondiabetic cutoff is
140/90, and for persons with diabetes, 130/80. 392 “Pre-diabetes,” a
label that arrives when patients score a fasting plasma glucose of
100–125 milligrams per deciliter, 393 should be treated with
lifestyle modifications, not medication, said the American
Diabetes Association in 2003; 394 five years later, the organization
switched to an official endorsement of drug therapy. 395
High-cholesterol diagnostic thresholds dropped from 280
milligrams per deciliter to 240, with a de facto minimum of 200
now guiding many physicians’ decisions to prescribe a statin
pill. 396
Ostensibly independent expert panels write the decisions to
define diagnostic criteria, but the pharmaceutical sector has left
visible fingerprints on lowered minimums. After a National
Institutes of Health panel recommended dropping the threshold
388. Id.
389. See id. (confirming a “pronounced lowering of diagnostic thresholds for
chronic conditions” resulting in a dramatic rise in diagnosis and treatment
“notably [for] diabetes and hypertension”).
390. Id.
391. See id. (“Revised guidelines encourage treatment of preconditions.”).
392. Id. The recommendation applies to some classes of these patients. Id.
393. Meta J. Kreiner & Linda M. Hunt, The Pursuit of Preventive Care for
Chronic Illness: Turning Healthy People into Chronic Patients, 36 SOC. OF
HEALTH & ILLNESS 870, 882 n.1 (2013).
394. Id. at 874.
395. See id. (“[T]he 2008 ADA guidelines recommend medications for
pre-diabetic individuals who have other risk factors such as obesity, family
history or certain racial/ethnic identities.”).
396. See ANGELL, supra note 365, at 85–86 (discussing this instance as
among the dubious methods used to prop up a lucrative drug).
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for hyperlipidemia and had its recommendation accepted, the
former editor in chief of the New England Journal of Medicine
pointed out that “most panel members who helped write the
recommendations”—two out of nine—“had financial ties to the
pharmaceutical companies that stood to gain enormously from
increased use of statins.” 397 Nine out of eleven physician panelists
who in 2003 joined an official recommendation to lower the
criteria for high blood pressure had similar ties to drug
companies in the form of research funding, stock ownership, or
payments for consulting work. 398
The drug sector benefits from lowered thresholds other than
those that increase sales of chronic-condition medications. In a
memoir about her life in the weight classification of “super
morbidly obese,” Roxane Gay observes that the National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute decided to reduce the body-mass index
number that declares weight to be normal to 25, “thereby
doubling the number of obese Americans.” 399 A stated reason for
this choice: “A round number like 25 would be easy for people to
remember.” 400 No drug-business influence like research funding
or consulting income here, but a similar stake for rent seeking:
Obesity is lucrative because vendors sell not only prescription
drugs but prepared foods, dietary supplements, gym
memberships and exercise regimens, books with orders about
what to eat and not eat, and other commodities pointed at weight
loss. 401 The most effective treatment for obesity, bariatric
surgery, is so costly that according to a study published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association, this intervention
“does not reduce overall health care costs in the long term,” 402
397. Jerome Kassirer, Why Should We Swallow What These Studies Say?,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at B3.
398. RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS 86–88
(2006).
399. See ROXANE GAY, HUNGER: A MEMOIR OF (MY) BODY 11–12 (2017)
(discussing the arbitrary nature of many medical designations).
400. Id.
401. See Alice Juler, The Political Economy of Obesity: The Fat Pay All, in
FOOD AND CULTURE: A READER (Carole Counihan & Penny Van Esterik eds., 3d
ed. 2013) 546, 551–52 (examining the marketing structure centered around
obesity).
402. Matthew L. Maciejewski & David E. Arterburn, Cost-effectiveness of
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even though researchers have estimated the cost of obesity itself
as more than $209.7 billion in health care expenses alone, not
counting other consequences like job absenteeism. 403 The more
people are taken out of the leave-them-alone “normal” weight
category, the more customers emerge. 404
Lowered minimums for established diseases is a mundane
way for an idea-free manufacturer to make money; Eli Lilly did
much better by recasting its old drug as the cure for a new
disease. 405 Just when Prozac, the brand name for fluoxetine
hydrochloride, was about to go off patent, its manufacturer won
FDA approval to rebrand this active ingredient as Sarafem. 406
Sarafem contains the exact same fluoxetine hydrochloride as in
Prozac and patients consume it in the same dose—twenty
milligrams a day407—but it travels to a different therapeutic
goal. 408 Instead of depression, Sarafem addresses premenstrual
dysphoric disorder (“PMDD”), a label that the FDA started to
recognize as a mental disorder in 1998, 409 following a Lilly-funded
meeting of four FDA officials with six Lilly executives. 410

Bariatric Surgery, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 742, 742 (2013).
403. See John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of
Obesity: An Instrumental Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 227
(2012).
404. See GAY, supra note 399, at 11–12 (attributing the increased number of
Americans now considered obese to the shift in the BMI calculation structure).
405. See Alicia Rebensdorf, The Pimping of Prozac for PMS, ALTERNET (June
12, 2001), https://perma.cc/T8DY-54HX (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (“[It] has to
do with money, with commerce, with, basically, sly marketing.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
406. See id. (discussing the history of Sarafem as the successor of Prozac).
407. See id. (“Sarafem/Prozac both require 20 mg. doses . . . . You don’t take
Sarafem any less often. You don’t take it [in] any smaller doses.”).
408. See id. (“The company . . . turned the depression-stigmatized label
Prozac to the oh-so-feminine name Sarafem” to treat PMDD).
409. See JAMES DAVIES, CRACKED: THE UNHAPPY TRUTH ABOUT PSYCHIATRY 76
(2013) (recalling the history of premenstrual dysphoric disorder).
410. See John Fauber et al., For One Condition, the Drugs Came Before the
Disorder,
MILWAUKEE
J.-SENTINEL
(Nov.
15,
2016,
11:02
PM),
https://perma.cc/SU5M-MCPC (last updated Jan. 7, 2016, 3:43 PM) (last visited
Oct. 29, 2019) (explaining that the meeting led the FDA and drug executives to
conclude, on their own, that premenstrual dysphoric disorder was a clinical
disorder necessitating selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors as treatment) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The American Psychiatric Association did not recognize
PMDD as a distinct psychiatric condition until 2013—“a
determination that was based on the recommendation of a panel
on which nearly 70% of the members had drug company ties.” 411
Lilly rolled out Sarafem in pink instead of Prozac’s green. 412 No
accident: Drug designers know better than to make
erectile-dysfunction pills in pink, writes the psychotherapist
James Davies, or “a menstruation pill that is dark red.” 413
3. Which Drug Stands in for the Sector’s Products?
When William Prosser named only one pharmaceutical
product in comment k to his Section 402A of the Second
Restatement, the drug he chose was the heroically formed
Pasteur rabies vaccine. 414 The item is so excellent that even
though it cannot be safe, Prosser suggested, it is never
unreasonably dangerous. 415
Louis Pasteur moved to rabies in 1885 after working on other
important applications of microbiology. 416 He gave the vaccine he
had synthesized to a nine-year-old boy who had been bitten
severely by feral dogs. 417 Pasteur had done nothing resembling
safety tests of his invention, but without an experimental
treatment young Joseph Meister was headed for a swift death. 418
About a century and a half later, rabies still has no cure; it
remains a fatal, painful disease that medicine cannot even
alleviate, let alone reverse. 419 Prevention in the form of
411. Id.
412. See Rebensdorf, supra note 406 (suggesting that Eli Lilly changed the
pill color from green to pink to appeal to female customers).
413. DAVIES, supra note 409, at 79.
414. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
415. Id.
416. See GERALD L. GEISON, THE PRIVATE SCIENCE OF LOUIS PASTEUR 181
(1995) (narrating Pasteur’s shift in focus from anthrax to rabies).
417. Id. at 206–07.
418. See id. at 206–12 (stating that Pasteur’s administration of the rabies
vaccine to Meister was the first administration of the vaccine to a human being;
prior to the attack, Pasteur had treated only dogs).
419. See Shimau Zhu & Caiping Guo, Rabies Control and Treatment: From
Prophylaxis to Strategies with Curative Potential, 8 VIRUSES 279, 293 (2016)
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vaccination is the hope for persons vulnerable to rabies following
a traumatic impact like an animal bite. 420 And so Prosser spoke
for a consensus when he wrote in comment k that terrible side
effects do not make this product defective, unreasonably
designed, or in any way deserving of condemnation in court. 421
This noble substance embodies therapeutic drugs at their
best. It saves lives when all alternatives would fail. 422 Its
inventor created it out of wholly benevolent motives. 423 To the
extent it does harm, its harm is necessary. Prosser coined the
phrase “unavoidably unsafe” to describe an urgent need that can
be met nowhere else. 424
Full props to Pasteur and his vaccine, but one drug—a
substance invented in France back when Grover Cleveland was
president of the United States and that has been superseded in
current rabies therapy 425—cannot stand in for the entire output
of the sector. Any equating of prescription drugs with gains to
social welfare à la comment k has to reckon with what this entire
category of product does, rather than confine itself to one
triumph. A counterpoint to the sole useful item for one painful
and fatal disease, I suggest, is a drug at the other end of the
utility-and-benevolence spectrum.
Here are a few numbers about what routinely—and
accurately—gets called an epidemic. In 2018, a nonprofit health
research institute announced its estimate of the cost of a crisis in
the United States from 2001 to 2017: more than a trillion
(noting that rabies still does not have a cure).
420. See id. at 280 (explaining that rabies can be prevented through the
administration of a vaccine after exposure to the virus).
421. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST.
1965) (“Since the disease invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the
marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified . . . .”).
422. See Zhu & Gho, supra note 419, at 279 (stating that vaccination “is the
only approved, effective method for post-exposure prophylaxis against rabies in
humans”).
423. But see generally GEISON, supra note 416 (criticizing Pasteur for
shortcomings of ethics and research methods).
424. See id. (recognizing that vaccines have a high level of inherent,
unavoidable risk).
425. See Zhu & Gho, supra note 419, at 280 (discussing the development of
live-attenuated virus-based rabies vaccines, which emerged long after the
Pasteur invention and are safer and more effective for post-exposure
prophylaxis).
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dollars. 426 An estimated two to four million persons in the United
States suffered from opioid disorders in 2016, 427 and 72,000
persons died of drug overdoses (not all from opioids and some of
them from mixes of opioids and other drugs) in 2017, a record
number. 428 “According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, nearly half of all opioid overdose deaths involve a
prescription opioid,” 429 writes a student commentator, “and in
2013,
providers
wrote
nearly
250,000,000
opioid
prescriptions—enough for every adult in the United States to
have his ‘own bottle of pills.’” 430 Recent years marked an
extraordinary reduction in life expectancy in the United States, 431
a development that experts have attributed to increased
opioid-overdose deaths. 432 The catastrophe at issue here ranks
among the worst public health disasters in American history. 433
426. See Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since
2001, ALTARUM (Feb. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/249N-UEXL (last visited Oct.
16, 2019) [hereinafter ALTARUM] (discussing the cost of the opioid epidemic as
inclusive of lost wages, lost productivity, lost tax revenue, health care costs, and
additional spending across different sectors) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
427. Margot Sanger-Katz, Bleak New Estimates in Drug Epidemic: A Record
72,000 Overdose Deaths in 2017, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/X5HA-WM6E (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
428. See id. (finding that drug overdose deaths reached a record high due to
higher levels of opioid use and deadlier drug combinations).
429. Alyssa M. McClure, Note, Illegitimate Overprescription: How Burrage v.
United States Is Hindering Punishment of Physicians and Bolsters the Opioid
Epidemic, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1747, 1750–51 (2018) (citations omitted).
430. Id.
431. See Grace Donnelly, Here’s Why Life Expectancy in the U.S. Dropped
Again This Year, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/7M67-UJUJ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2019) (reporting that the new average life expectancy for
Americans is 78.7 years, “which puts the U.S. behind other developed nations[,]”
including “Canada, Germany, Mexico, France, Japan, and the U.K.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
432. See id. (finding that the reduction in life expectancy is partially due to
drug overdoses).
433. See BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY
THAT ADDICTED AMERICA 9 (2018) (deeming the opioid crisis the “worst drug
epidemic in American history”); see also Neil Howe, America’s Opioid Crisis: A
Nation Hooked, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:42 PM), https://perma.cc/3MRW-8KPR
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (deeming opioid crisis the “worst public health crisis
in American history”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Prescription opioids are at least as worthy as the Pasteur
rabies vaccine to serve as the industry exemplar in an overview of
American drug products liability law and policy. They are more
American in their origin, more recently invented (yet established
enough to have a track record in health policy and law), more
visible in contemporary litigation and law enforcement, 434 more
significant within the national economy, 435 and much more widely
consumed. 436 Moving as needed between the drug named
OxyContin in particular and all prescription opioids in general,
let us consider some contrasts between them and the Pasteur
vaccine.
Amenability to dangerous misuse. No user can alter a dose of
rabies vaccine to make it more dangerous. The only way to
434. See Ausness, supra note 7 (reviewing opioid actions filed by
governments); see also Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2302–03 (providing a
summary of opioid litigation around the country); Thomas Sullivan, Opioid
Class Action Suit Filed in Five States, POL’Y & MED. (last updated May 14,
2018), https://perma.cc/42D5-BWCG (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (summarizing
lawsuits filed against opioid distributors and the subsequent allegations) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
435. See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie et al., The Economic Burden of the Opioid
Epidemic on States: The Case of Medicaid, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (July 30, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2F2H-8GDC (last visited Dec. 9, 2019) (estimating that the
overall societal cost of opioid use disorders—including health care, criminal
justice, and workplace costs—reached $78.5 billion in 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
436. The significance of this product is suggested by the long list of books
about it as a crisis published in the last couple of years, a roster not limited to
CHARLES ATKINS, OPIOID USE DISORDER: A HOLISTIC GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT,
TREATMENT, AND RECOVERY (2018); NICHOLAS BUSH, ONE BY ONE: A MEMOIR OF
LOVE AND LOSS IN THE SHADOWS OF OPIOID AMERICA (2018); J.N. CAMPBELL &
STEVEN ROONEY, A TIME-RELEASE HISTORY OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2018); BRIAN
ALLEN CARR, OPIOID, INDIANA (2019); MAUREEN CAVANAGH, IF YOU LOVE ME: A
MOTHER'S JOURNEY THROUGH HER DAUGHTER'S OPIOID ADDICTION (2020); RYAN
HAMPTON, AMERICAN FIX: INSIDE THE OPIOID ADDICTION CRISIS—AND HOW TO END
IT (2018); TIFFANY JENKINS, HIGH ACHIEVER: THE INCREDIBLE TRUE STORY OF ONE
ADDICT'S DOUBLE LIFE (2019); MACY, supra note 433; MEIER, supra note 7; LIZ
MOORE, LONG BRIGHT RIVER (2020); HARRY NELSON, THE UNITED STATES OF
OPIOIDS: A PRESCRIPTION FOR LIBERATING A NATION IN PAIN (2019); YNGVILD
OLSEN & JOSHUA M. SHARFSTEIN, THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW (2019); TRAVIS RIEDER, IN PAIN: A BIOETHICIST’S PERSONAL STRUGGLE
WITH OPIOIDS (2019); TERENCE G. SCHILLER, OPIOID EPIDEMIC: A NATIONAL PLAN
TO STOP IT (2018); DANIEL SKINNER & BERKELEY FRANZ, NOT FAR FROM ME:
STORIES OF OPIOIDS AND OHIO (2019); KIMBERLY SUE, GETTING WRECKED: WOMEN,
INCARCERATION, AND THE AMERICAN OPIOID CRISIS (2019); EILENE ZIMMERMAN,
SMACKED: A STORY OF WHITE-COLLAR AMBITION, ADDICTION, AND TRAGEDY (2020).
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misuse this drug is to administer it to someone who has
experienced no exposure to rabies. This unfortunate individual
will suffer harmful side effects and gain no benefit.
OxyContin as a lab creation differed from rival painkillers
like Vicodin and Percocet in its longer-acting formulation. 437
Approving it as a new drug in 1995, the FDA permitted the
manufacturer to claim that the long-acting design “was believed
to reduce” OxyContin’s appeal to drug abusers. 438 No clinical
evidence backed this claim; the agency was simply willing to
accept without evidence that shorter-acting design meant a faster
hit that abusers would value. 439 Purdue, its manufacturer,
“trained sales representative to tell doctors that OxyContin was
less addictive and prone to abuse than competing opioids, claims
beyond the one approved by the F.D.A.” 440
Users easily learned that OxyContin contained significantly
higher narcotic levels than its shorter-acting rivals, and they
learned how to abuse it. 441 The long-acting Purdue opioid called
MS Contin was written up in a 1996 medical journal as a favorite
of addicts who had learned how to extract morphine from MS
Contin and inject it. 442 In 1998, Purdue learned about a study
published in a medical journal that identified MS Contin as
addicts’ favorite opioid, for the same high-narcotics condition
found also in OxyContin. 443 Purdue did not report what it had

437. See Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7C96-L49E (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (reporting that the FDA
allowed Purdue Pharma to uniquely claim that OxyContin’s long-acting
formulation posed less of a threat of abuse than other painkillers) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
438. Id.
439. See id. (“The [FDA] decision was not based on findings from clinical
trials, but a theory that drug abusers favored shorter-acting painkillers because
the narcotic they contained was released faster and so produced a quicker
‘hit.’”).
440. Id.
441. See id. (explaining that the long-acting Oxycontin could be snorted or
injected intravenously).
442. See id. (detailing abusers’ process of extracting morphine from MS
Contin in Australia and New Zealand).
443. See id. (referencing an article from the Journal of the Canadian
Medical Association reporting that MS Contin sold for $40 per 30-milligram
tablet on the illegal drug market—the highest price of any prescription opioid).
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learned to the FDA, and expanded its marketing campaign. 444
The method of dangerous misuse started soon after the
OxyContin launch in 1996 and continued until 2010. 445
Addicts and abusers learned to crush this pill to obtain full
delivery of the opioid without the delay installed by its
time-release feature. 446 Crushed (meaning pulverized) OxyContin
could be snorted, smoked, or dissolved in water and then
injected. 447 In 2010, Purdue reformulated OxyContin to defeat
this alteration, and today’s OxyContin when pounded turns into a
gummy gel rather than an easy-to-ingest powder. 448 Users have
passed around trips to defeat gummification of the
opioid—including baking it, freezing it, and soaking it in a
variety of solvents—but few of these modifications seem to
work. 449 Frustrated by Purdue’s reformulation, a significant
number of these users abandoned their crush technique, which
would have been a positive development if they had moved to
abstinence from opioids rather than to heroin and other
narcotics. 450
Overpromotion. Sellers cannot overpromote a rabies vaccine,
or at least they have never in known history been observed trying
to overpromote this drug. 451 Patients who receive it as a
444. See id. (reporting that Purdue instead gave the FDA and its sales
officials an older survey that contradicted the Canadian study because “the
company did not consider the small study’s results significant”).
445. See William N. Evans et al., How the Reformulation of OxyContin
Ignited the Heroin Epidemic, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that
Purdue’s reformulation of OxyContin in 2010 made the drug less appealing to
drug abusers).
446. See Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, Drug Is Harder to Abuse, but
Users Persevere, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/U3KH-9PBR (last
visited Oct. 17, 2019) (stating that pre-2010, users discovered that crushing
OxyContin tablets “produced an instant high as powerful as heroin”).
447. Id.
448. See id. (noting that the reformulation is intended to deter abuse and
many patients are frustrated by their inability to crush and inject the drug).
449. Id.
450. See id. (observing that Opana, a time-release painkiller similar to
Oxycontin, “is showing up increasingly in police reports and has been blamed for
a rash of overdose deaths”); see also Evans, supra note 445, at 1 (arguing that
many drug abusers switch to heroin because it offers a cheaper and more
accessible high than modified OxyContin).
451. See Zhu & Guo, supra note 419, at 280–81 (providing a brief history of
the rabies vaccine).
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treatment need it urgently. Externalities of its distribution and
use exist—that was Prosser’s point when he used it to stand in
for all prescription drugs—but by hypothesis they are as low as
possible because only people who must have this substance will
buy it. 452
Opioids, by contrast, went to patients for whom this drug
would do harm, and it reached them because manufacturers
chose an extraordinarily aggressive marketing strategy. 453 Opioid
overpromotion reached its most egregious heights with
OxyContin. Purdue hosted more than forty pain management
symposia between 1996 and 2001, paying all expenses for more
than 5,000 physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to be trained for
a national speaker bureau. 454 Purdue also paid bonuses to its
detailers to make sales calls to physicians identified in a database
as the highest prescribers of opioids in the country. 455 It handed
out approximately 34,000 coupons for a free prescription of its
drug, and an array of branded promotional items for physicians
that the Drug Enforcement Administration said was
unprecedented in the history of opioid sales. 456 Although Purdue
directed most of its marketing budget toward prescribers, it also
promoted OxyContin to the public through a website called
Partners Against Pain. 457

452. See id. at 281 (“Unlike most other vaccines . . . rabies vaccines are
designed to be . . . administered primarily in a post-exposure manner.”).
453. See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text.
454. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221–22 (2009).
455. See id. at 222 (documenting the targeting of specific providers by
Purdue Pharma salespeople to encourage OxyContin prescriptions).
456. See id. (noting Purdue Pharma’s distribution of coupons for a free
limited-time prescription for a 7- to -30 day supply of OxyContin); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN
ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 25 (2003),
https://perma.cc/YS8K-2LC4 (PDF) (recognizing that marketing techniques used
by Purdue Pharma to sell OxyContin were unprecedented among schedule II
opioids).
457. See Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement:
How the OxyContin Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability
May Make Pharmaceutical Companies Liable for Black Markets, 100 NW. U.L.
REV. 1409, 1430 n.172 (2006) (revealing that “Partners Against Pain . . . offered
information about chronic pain and its treatments to the general public”).
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The manufacturer of OxyContin paid for other misbehaviors
that included but were not limited to overpromotion, 458 and other
drug manufacturers also overpromoted opioids. 459 Purdue had an
agreement with the bigger and more established Abbott
Laboratories to engage in joint promotion of OxyContin, paying
Abbott a commission on sales. 460 Cephalon paid $425 million to
settle federal charges that it engaged in overpromotion in the
form of recommending unauthorized off-label uses of its opioid
Actiq. 461 Another manufacturer paid less, just a tenth of the
Cephalon sum, to settle Justice Department allegations that it
“paid health care providers to induce them to promote or
prescribe” Kadian, its opioid. 462 In 2019, law enforcement in this
area escalated when executives of Insys Therapeutics,
manufacturer of a transmucosal immediate-release fentanyl
product, were convicted of federal racketeering charges for
conduct that included bribing physicians to prescribe this
opioid. 463
Incentives for cohorts to join in socially destructive conduct.
Just as the rabies vaccine cannot be modified to become more
458. See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://perma.cc/EM6N-3NQT (last visited Oct. 17,
2019) (reporting that Purdue Pharma executives pleaded guilty to misbranding
OxyContin’s true level of addictiveness) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
459. See supra notes 298, 317 and accompanying text.
460. See Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ohio 2004)
(mentioning the agreement to share promotion obligations and profits from
OxyContin net sales).
461. See Evan Hughes, The Pain Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 2, 2018),
https://perma.cc/ZN47-LXR6 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (pointing out that the
criminal guilty plea and settlement did not stop Cephalon from being acquired
for $6.8 billion just three years later) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
462. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alpharma to
Pay $42.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in Connection with
Promotion of Drug Kadian (Mar. 16, 2010), https://perma.cc/W44H-WXVG (last
updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
463. See Gabrielle Emmanuel & Katie Thomas, Top Executives of Insys, an
Opioid Company, Are Found Guilty of Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/LE97-Z57R (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (reporting that federal
authorities also recently filed “felony drug trafficking charges against a major
pharmaceutical distributor” of opioids and two of its former executives) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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dangerous to a user, it also does not invite other populations into
deleterious behaviors that a drug manufacturer starts. Opioids
endangered the public not only through misconduct by their
manufacturers, but by in effect recruiting constituencies into
harm. 464 Actions by physicians, patients, and drug distributors
compounded the dangers that manufacturers initiated. 465
Physicians compound the harm of overpromotion when they
choose to overprescribe this drug. 466 This pattern inverts the
trope of the learned intermediary, which in the law of warning
defect posits the physician as an intelligent inhibitor of ignorance
and impulse on the part of patients. 467 Examples of opioid
overpromotion noted in this Article were investments that paid
off: doctors responded to these marketing initiatives by writing
scripts. 468 Criminal, occupational-regulatory, and tort sanctions
can befall physicians for wrongs related to drug prescriptions. 469
All
these
sanctions
have
been
applied
to
opioid
over-prescribers, 470 but the magnitude of the crisis greatly
464. See Van Zee, supra note 454, at 222–23 (reviewing the great lengths to
which Purdue Pharma went to convince health care providers that OxyContin
was a safe treatment for chronic, non-cancer-related pain).
465. See id. at 223 (finding that drug distributors’ marketing tactics
encouraged physicians to prescribe opioids in unprecedented amounts).
466. See id. (documenting high prescribing areas by geography, with Maine,
West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and Alabama
prescribing opioids “5 to 6 times higher than the national average” by the year
2000).
467. See supra Part IV.B; see also Ben A. Rich & Lynn R. Webster, A Review
of Forensic Implications of Opioid Prescribing with Examples from Malpractice
Cases Involving Opioid-related Overdose, 12 PAIN MED. S59, S62 (2011) (noting
physicians’ professional responsibility regarding the safety and efficacy of
treatment options).
468. See Van Zee, supra note 454, at 223 (reporting that after Purdue
started promoting OxyContin for non-cancer pain, prescriptions increased
almost tenfold, “from about 670,000 in 1997 to about 6.2 million in 2002”). For a
review of the evidence that overpromotion increases prescribing, see supra note
294 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of promotional gifts on
physicians’ prescribing practices).
469. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018) (imposing criminal penalties under the
Controlled Substances Act); see also Rich & Webster, supra note 467, at
S62–S63 (listing various theories of physician liability, including medical
malpractice).
470. See, e.g., United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2017)
(affirming the conviction of a physician for violating the Controlled Substances
Act); Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding a
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exceeds the rate and severity of consequences that physicians
have suffered. 471
Continuing the actions of manufacturers that overpromote
and physicians who over-prescribe, patients expand the harmful
effects of this product by over-consumption. 472 The drug seeker
who persuades a physician to write an opioid prescription for
something other than physical pain is familiar to public health. 473
Refraining from blaming this category of patient, the medical
ethicists Kelly Dineen and James DuBois take issue with the
“duped” trope that faults physicians for believing complaints of
severe pain. 474 Dineen and Dubois report that efforts to train
subjects to tell the difference between fake and real pain fail, and
note the unfortunate finding of “a connection between emotional
intelligence and susceptibility to deception.” 475 A student author
faults patients more overtly. Most of the harm of OxyContin, he
notes, stemmed from deliberate misuse: consumers bought this
drug in an illegal market and sought it for recreation. 476
According to litigation initiated around the country by both
prosecutors in federal court and by cities and counties in state
courts, pharmaceutical distributors expanded the harms of this
$15,000,000 punitive damages award for negligent over-prescription of opioids);
Doctor Gives Up License After Opioid Allegations, CHERRY HILL COURIER-POST
(Apr. 17, 2018, 8:08 PM), https://perma.cc/Y9LH-AGS9 (last updated Apr. 20,
2018, 1:07 PM) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (covering a physician who agreed to
stop practicing medicine after being accused of recklessly prescribing
painkillers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
471. See Opioid Overdose, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://perma.cc/P73H-24FW (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) (last visited Dec. 9,
2019) (reporting that “on average, 130 Americans die every day from an opioid
overdose”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
472. See supra notes 427–428 and accompanying text.
473. See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While
Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (2016) (providing examples of
“frequent flier” patients and those who fool physicians into prescribing pain
medication with the intent to sell the prescription).
474. See id. at 11 (defining a “duped” physician as one who “inadvertently
supplies drugs to a drug abuser because the physician has been deceived by a
drug abuser posing as a patient”).
475. Id. at 13.
476. See Prater, supra note 457, at 1411 (referencing West Virginia’s $10
million settlement with Purdue Pharma for harms caused by Oxycontin’s
recreational use).
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drug. 477 These businesses, plaintiffs claim, shipped excessive
quantities of opioids to pharmacies in violation of the Controlled
Substances Act, 478 which required them to report suspicious
orders. 479 Mallinckrodt, Inc., McKesson Corporation, Kinray LLC,
and Cardinal Health, Inc. all settled federal actions accusing
them of violating this statute not only by failing to report, but by
failing to implement an effective detection system (a lapse by
Mallinckrodt), 480 failing to abide by an earlier agreement with the
federal government to monitor sales (McKesson), 481 and violating
state recordkeeping laws (Kinray and Cardinal Health). 482
Collateral effects. Whenever the rabies vaccine causes harm,
this injury stops at the body of the one who takes it; the harm of
opioids goes beyond a physical impact on one person. 483 Take
HIV. One study begins by noting that opioid dependence and HIV
have been linked from the start in the United States, with heroin
users at risk of contracting the virus from sharing and reusing

477. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2302–03 (providing a summary
of opioid litigation around the country); Sullivan, supra note 434 (summarizing
lawsuits filed against opioid distributors and the subsequent allegations); see
also Emmanuel & Thomas, supra note 463 (reporting federal drug trafficking
charges brought against an opioid distributor).
478. 21 U.S.C. § 832 (2018).
479. See id. (delineating the reporting requirements for pharmaceutical
distributors).
480. See Lenny Bernstein et al., Mallinckrodt Reaches Settlement with
‘Bellwether’ Counties in Mammoth Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2019,
4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/B2BN-N42M (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) (“Under the
deal, Mallinckrodt would pay [two Ohio] counties $24 million in cash and donate
$6 million in drugs, including addiction treatment medications.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
481. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2303 (noting that McKesson’s
settlement agreement included an agreement to modify its marketing and
distribution practices).
482. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cardinal
Health Agrees to $44 Million Settlement for Alleged Violations of the Controlled
Substances Act (Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/SDQ5-4PVG (last visited Nov.
22, 2019) (“[T]he Southern District of New York has entered into a separate
settlement agreement . . . in which Cardinal agreed to resolve allegations that
Kinray, Inc., a subsidiary distributor, failed to report suspicious orders by
pharmacies in the Kinray service area.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
483. See ALTARUM, supra note 426 (discussing the impact of opioid abuse on
individuals, their families, the health care system, and society in general).
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syringes. 484 Heroin is not the only opioid, as we know, and this
study went on to find that users of oxycodone (the generic name
for the drug that started its life named OxyContin) had sex with
more partners than did heroin users, a behavior the authors
called high risk for the spread of HIV. 485 Individuals who start
their opioid use with prescriptions and then switch to injecting
heroin move to a much riskier drug experience, as is taught in
reverse by a United Nations study that found that substituting
non-injected opioids for injected drugs lowered the risk of HIV
transmission by fifty-four percent. 486
Just as the pathologies of prescription opioids are not limited
to what they do to the human body when ingested, the drugs they
enlist as agents of harm are not limited to their original
incarnations. Dependency can follow from prescriptions that are
too easy to obtain and renew; 487 when crackdowns make this
release harder to obtain lawfully, users move to cheaper and
more accessible substitutes like heroin and illegal fentanyl. 488
Evidence supports this gateway-drug contention. 489 Writing about
484. See Christina S. Meade et al., HIV Risk Behavior in Opioid Dependent
Adults Seeking Detoxification Treatment: An Exploratory Comparison of Heroin
and Oxycodone Users, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 289, 289 (2009) (tracking the link
between HIV and heroin use to the early 1980s).
485. See id. at 293 (suggesting that HIV prevention efforts should be
targeted to oxycodone users as well as heroin users).
486. JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, MILES TO GO: CLOSING GAPS,
BREAKING BARRIERS, RIGHTING INJUSTICES 51 (2018), https://perma.cc/NF4348MV (PDF).
487. Cf. Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2302 (highlighting cases in which
prescribed opioid users were misled by companies’ misrepresentations of the
addictiveness of their drugs).
488. See Sarpatwari, supra note 368, at 477 (noting the “burgeoning” use of
heroin and illicit opioids as a substitute for prescribed opioids).
489. See Theodore J. Cicero et al., The Changing Face of Heroin Use in the
United States: A Retrospective Analysis of the Past 50 Years, 71 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N PSYCHIATRY 821, 822 (2014) (citing the “growing evidence” that
prescription opioid users “graduate or shift to heroin”); see also Wilson M.
Compton et al., Relationship Between Nonmedical Prescription-Opioid Use and
Heroin Use, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 154, 156–159 (2016) (citing national-level,
general-population data showing that a sizeable majority of persons who
recently started to use heroin—one study counted 77.4% and the other
79.5%—had been prescribed opioids nonmedically); Heroin, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, https://perma.cc/QCH4-QDYH (last updated June 2018) (last visited
Nov. 7, 2019) (“Research now suggests that misuse of [opioid] medications may
actually open the door to heroin use.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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the role of physicians as opioid over-prescribers, a psychiatrist
adverts to a second gateway hypothesis: the possibility that a
“fundamental biological mechanism based on the chemical
composition of the [prescription opioid] drug itself” leads a user to
move to street drugs. 490 Illicit drug markets bring social harms
beyond what the substances themselves do when ingested. 491
Another collateral consequence of prescription opioids has
been significant in a nation where more than thirty percent of all
persons, and more than forty percent of older adults, suffer from
chronic pain. 492 Centers for Disease Control guidelines published
in 2016 steered physicians to prescribe lower doses of opioids 493 at
the same time that state laws, Medicare rules, and large
pharmacy chains made prescriptions harder to refill. 494 Anguish
that would not have occurred but for the so-called opioid epidemic
ensued and remains in place. A physician-neuroscientist notes
the lamentable nature of this suffering: “While diversion and
illicit use is real, the great majority of individuals abusing opioids
(usually young people) are getting ‘high’ taking grandma’s
Oxycontin®, stealing it or buying it from their friends or relatives
and do not get them by prescription from an MD.” 495 Constraints
take prescriptions from people in physical distress. 496 One news
Review).
490. ANNA LEMBKE, DRUG DEALER MD 22 (2016).
491. See, e.g., Meade, supra note 484, at 289 (addressing the risks of
contracting and spreading HIV associated with illicit opioid use).
492. Nora D. Volkow & A. Thomas McLellan, Opioid Abuse in Chronic
Pain—Misconceptions and Mitigation Strategies, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253,
1253 (2016).
493. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL MORBIDITY &
MORALITY WKLY. REP. 2016;65 (NO. RR-1): 1–49.
494. See Terrence McCoy, ‘Unintended Consequences’: Inside the Fallout of
America’s Crackdown on Opioids, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018),
https://perma.cc/6VFP-DSWN (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (“Dozens of states,
Medicare and large pharmacy chains . . . have since announced or imposed
restrictions on opioid prescriptions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
495. Howard L. Fields, The Doctor’s Dilemma: Opiate Analgesics and
Chronic Pain, 69 NEURON 591, 592 (2011).
496. See McCoy, supra note 494 (sharing stories of chronic pain patients
whose prescriptions were tapered—“some by 50 percent, others by 90”—to bring
them within CDC guidelines).
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story about the prescriptions crackdown quoted a nurse
practitioner who decided to close her pain practice because she
could no longer tolerate having to “choose between hurting
patients by providing inadequate prescriptions and going to
prison for exceeding CDC guidelines.” 497
Numerous other collateral effects have spread past
individuals who used opioids themselves. Tens of thousands of
children of addicted parents have gone to foster care. 498 Fentanyl,
which killed the popular musicians Prince and Tom Petty499 and
which in its FDA-regulated version has functioned as both a
gateway to illicit drugs and an alternative to prescribed opioid
pills when they become unavailable, 500 has street versions with
names like Apache, China Girl, Dance Fever, and Murder 8.
Street fentanyls dominate the death tally for this drug, which
rose by 540% in the three years ending in 2016. 501 One Brookings
Institute study attributes to opioids about a fifth of the decline in
men’s labor force participation since 2007. 502 Another Brookings
paper attributes extraordinary and unprecedented violence in the
Mexico to north-of-the-border demand for opiates. 503
497. Id.
498. See Jeanne Whalen, The Children of the Opioid Crisis, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 15, 2016, 10:46 AM), https://perma.cc/3C6E-4XCS (last visited Oct. 18,
2019) (reporting that many of the children are “growing up in mayhem”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
499. See David Browne, Music’s Fentanyl Crisis: Inside the Drug That Killed
Prince and Tom Petty, ROLLING STONE (June 20, 2018, 2:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/T76L-C8V3 (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (confirming that Prince
and Petty, who had both been prescribed fentanyl, died from overdosing on the
drug) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In Petty’s case, “two
other, more dangerous derivatives” of the prescribed fentanyl were found in his
system, suggesting an acquisition from the black market. Id.
500. See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
501. See Josh Katz, The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in
Three Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/8Y4K-M5X8 (last
visited Nov. 7, 2019) (“[D]eaths involving synthetic opioids, mostly fentanyls,
have risen to more than 20,000 from 3,000 in just three years.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
502. See Alan B. Krueger, Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiry
into the Decline of the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2017, at 49 (“[T]he increase in opioid prescriptions could
perhaps account for a 0.6 percentage point decline in male labor force
participation, which is 20 percent of the observed decline during this period.”).
503. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Hooked: Mexico’s Violence and U.S. Demand
for Drugs, BROOKINGS INST. (May 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/A4DX-HQJ7 (last
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The question of innovation. Pasteur innovated to make his
vaccine; 504 OxyContin was enough of a copycat not to deserve the
patent that Purdue got for it. 505 Dubious entitlement to be called
novel is hardly the worst sin of this drug, but it warrants
attention because innovation by the sector is so central to Pillar
#4. Pharmaceutical companies profit from the notion that they
work devotedly to offer the next cure. 506
Sometimes they do just that. Vaccines in general, not just the
Pasteur exemplar, have made the world a healthier place. 507
Contemporary drugs for Hepatitis C offer another example. 508
Since 2014, treatment for this disease has moved from mostly
failure to cures for the large majority of patients treated, with a
new class of medications—direct-acting antivirals—earning the
credit. 509 At the other side of the ledger, next to OxyContin, sit
numerous drugs approved by the FDA even though they do not
make patients better off. 510 Naming opioids as illustrative of
prescription drugs fills in a mixed picture that has at least as
much non-innovation in it as health-generating novelty.
The question of effectiveness. Any assessment of a
prescription drug’s safety necessarily must engage with its
visited Oct. 18, 2019) (identifying “the rising taste in the United States for
opiates” as a driver for escalating violence in Mexico) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
504. See generally GEISON, supra note 416.
505. See Sarpatwari, supra note 368, at 468 (observing that Purdue’s patent
for extended-release oxycodone contained the same constituent elements of
Contin).
506. See, e.g., id. at 467 (explaining how Purdue “turned extended-release
oxycodone into a blockbuster”); cf. LaMattina, supra note 5 (listing reasons for
negative views of the pharmaceutical industry).
507. See Vaccines, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES (last updated
July 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/T3AN-GEB9 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (“Vaccines
provide a safe, cost-effective and efficient means of preventing illness . . . .”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
508. See Take a Bow, Pharma, for the Hepatitis C Drugs, MANAGED CARE
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/G59M-BEMU (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (noting
that hepatitis C treatment “has gone from failure rates as high as 70% to
success rates as a high as 99%”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
509. See id. (reporting that the direct-acting antivirals Olysio and Sovaldi
“drove the sustained viral response—no detectable virus after 12 weeks of
therapy—to 80% and 90% of patients, respectively”).
510. See supra Part IV.D.1.
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effectiveness, the upside counterpart to the downside of
inevitable risk. Rabies vaccines do a good job of warding off
rabies. 511 Opioids perform less well at their task of killing pain. 512
Evidence for this conclusion comes from a host of studies.
Patients in Veterans Affairs primary clinics suffering from two
types of chronic pain achieved no more relief from opioids than
non-opioid drugs. 513 Emergency room patients experiencing
moderate to severe pain gained as much relief from
acetaminophen and ibuprofen, also known by their brand names
Tylenol and Advil, as they did from opioids. 514 A significant
minority of patients in another study, about twenty percent,
reported that the opioids they took did not alleviate their pain; its
author identified what he called “46 possible pathologic causes”
for this ineffectiveness. 515
That opioids succeed in reducing pain when taken for
extended periods is unlikely. A 2017 meta-analysis that reviewed
sixty-seven studies examining eight intervention categories
concluded that no published finding has ever compared long-term
opioid therapy (defined as taking this medication for more than
one year) with “placebo, no opioid, or nonopioid therapies.” 516 One
telling datum on the ineffectiveness of prescription opioids:
511. See Charles E. Rupprecht et al., Rabies Vaccines, in PLOTKIN’S
VACCINES 918, 938 (7th ed. 2018) (examining the effectiveness of rabies
vaccines).
512. See, e.g., Andrew K. Chang et al., Effect of a Single Dose of Oral Opioid
and Nonopioid Analgesics on Acute Extremity Pain in the Emergency
Department: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1661, 1662–63
(2017) (comparing the effects of opioids with nonopioids on patients in
emergency departments and finding “no statistically significant or clinically
important differences in pain reduction”).
513. See Erin E. Krebs et al., Effect of Opioid vs Nonopioid Medications on
Pain-Related Function in Patients with Chronic Back Pain or Hip or Knee
Osteoarthritis Pain: The SPACE Randomized Clinical Trial, 319 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 872, 881 (2018) (“Treatment with opioids was not superior to treatment
with nonopioid medications for improving pain-related function over 12
months.”).
514. Chang, supra note 512, at 1663–64.
515. Forest Tennant, Why Oral Opioids May Not Be Effective in a Subset of
Chronic Pain Patients, 17 J. PAIN MGMT. S39 (2016).
516. Joseph W. Frank et al., Patient Outcomes in Dose Reduction or
Discontinuation of Long-Term Opioid Therapy: A Systematic Review, 167
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 181, 181 (2017).
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Although prescriptions have dropped in recent years, levels of
reported pain are unchanged. 517
V. Conclusion
Of all sources of physical injury to human bodies in the
United States, the sector that occupies in this Article enjoys
especially powerful shelter from legal accountability for the harm
it causes. 518 Prescription drugs unquestionably contribute to the
public good. That value noted, the rule of law ought to extend to
them. Products liability law furnishes well-established causes of
action to right this wrong. 519
Here, “the rule of law” means being within reach of legal
sanctions. Products liability law governs products. A few
categorical exceptions to products liability recourse do exist, but
they are written explicitly into legislation. Guns and vaccines
illustrate the category of explicit statutory immunity. 520 The
immunity enjoyed by prescription drugs is the opposite of explicit.
Persons injured by one type of defective product turn out almost
certain to gain nothing in court even though all products liability
causes of action are in principle available to them. 521
Experience teaches that transparent immunity for
prescription drugs can be achieved. Federal legislation
addressing the closely related category of vaccine injury tells
517. See Robert Gebelhoff, The Opioid Epidemic Could Turn into a
Pandemic if We’re Not Careful, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:16 PM),
https://perma.cc/R5HE-3SM5 (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (“Despite no change in
the amount of pain reported in the United States, abuse of prescription
painkillers and heroin has exploded.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
518. See supra Parts III.A–III.C.
519. OWEN, supra note 20, at 552.
520. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
521. This reality makes a recent proposal from a prominent products
liability scholar especially bold. Mary Davis contends that liability for
pharmaceuticals ought to be strict, rooted in “causation and damage alone.”
Davis, supra note 159, at 447; see also id. at 448 (announcing a query:
“ultimately, the question remains: should every patient who suffers an adverse
side effect be recognized as having suffered an injury in law?” and answering
the question “yes”). At present, tort liability barely exists even when an injured
plaintiff can prove defect or fault.
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claimants explicitly what they hold and lack by way of a
remedy. 522 Judicial readings of the vaccine statute have
continued this clarity by stating that claims for design defect and
failure to warn are expressly preempted. 523 Even implied
preemption of claims against drug manufacturers, though more
veiled than the express kind, is clearer than the shadowy yet
comprehensive immunity reported in this Article. Attorneys who
represent plaintiffs and defendants in drug cases routinely
prepare for the prospect of summary judgment based on
preemption as an affirmative defense. 524
If products liability immunity for any object sold in commerce
is a good idea, let that immunity be known and intelligible. If
immunity is not desirable, then the object ought to face reckoning
in the courts. This Article has moved toward better reckoning
first by identifying (Almost) No Bad Drugs as a bottom-line result
and then by setting out to find origins of this extraordinary state
of the law. Near-total insulation from products liability had to be
laid out in these pages because it is not bounded by any statute,
regulation, judicial decision, or even another secondary writing.
Supports for my conclusion of “(almost) no bad drugs” exist at
three levels. First, numbers. Even the capacious criteria for
inclusion that I used yielded only a few pharmaceutical products
that have ever met with judicial condemnation in a personal
injury action. Second, both decisional law and torts Restatements
treat drug manufacturers with exceptional indulgence. The third
and most elusive support needed the longest exposition in this
Article. Pharmaceutical products, I argued, fare exceedingly well
in personal-injury liability law because widely held beliefs about
522. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
523. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (holding that
design defect claims brought against vaccine manufacturers are preempted); see
also Holmes v. Merck & Co., 697 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012) (extending
Bruesewitz by determining that failure to warn claims are also preempted, and
that preemption eliminates tort redress for the parents of a vaccine-injured
child).
524. See Arameh O’Boyle & Clancy Galgay, “Newly Acquired Information”
and Federal Preemption Defenses in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Cases,
AM. BAR ASS’N (July 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/746T-NH4B (last visited Oct. 18,
2019) (“Federal preemption remains the holy grail of defenses in pharmaceutical
products liability cases. A successful preemption defense can dispose of cases in
their entirety and often quite rapidly.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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the value of shelter from accountability prop them up. Even
before one particular type of prescription drug inflicted
catastrophic harm on American public health and welfare, these
premises earned the questioning they received here.

